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1 INTRODUCTION - Alfredo De Feo and Brigid Laffan
INTRODUCTION 
by Alfredo De Feo and Brigid Laffan
In October 2015 the Robert Schuman Centre 
organised a workshop on the Efficiency and 
Effectiveness of the EU budget as part of a project 
on the Evolution of Budgetary Powers and their 
Contribution to European Governance. A first 
seminar dedicated to Own Resources took place 
in April 20151
The EU budget represents only 1% of GNI but 
its impact on the economy is greater due to its 
leverage effects. How can the EU Budget be more 
focused on results, strengthening its efficiency 
and effectiveness? Improving the quality of 
expenditure is the challenge for the next few 
years. The workshop gathered several high-
profile participants representing the private sector 
and European and national institutions, and it 
benefitted from in-depth analysis and comments 
by academics and practitioners.
1 A. De Feo, Brigid Laffan, eds., EU own resources: 
Momentum for a reform, EUI, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/
budget/mff/hlgor/library/selected-readings/01-DOC-COMM-
EUORMomentumForReform-EUIDeFeoLaffan-Feb2016.pdf  
This edited volume groups the presentations 
delivered during the conference by Pier Carlo 
Padoan, Italian Finance Minister, and Kristalina 
Georgieva2, Vice President of the Commission, 
who was, at that time, in charge of the budget, and 
written contributions and reflections by some of 
the participants.
Brigid Laffan, Director of the Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies
Alfredo De Feo, Visiting Fellow at the Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies  
   
2  Kristalina Georgieva, Vice President of the Commission 
in office from 1/11/2014 to 31/12/2016. She was appointed Chief 
Executive Officer of the World Bank 2/1/2017
2 KEYNOTE - Pier Carlo Padoan
KEYNOTE
by Pier Carlo Padoan3 
Minister of Finance, Italy
Thank you very much for this opportunity. It’s a 
pleasure to be back here in a different temporary 
job. In the past I used to come here because of my 
academic activities and I always very much enjoyed 
the initiatives here at the EUI. I’d also like to thank 
Vice-President Georgieva for her remarks. Yes, we 
sit around the same table, a round table so there 
is no issue over who is on one side and who is on 
the other side regarding very difficult complex 
management issues, which of course are never 
only just technical management problems. They 
are always also deeply political problems, which 
by definition implies that we have to strive for 
common agreement over our choices, which is, 
of course, very much at the heart of what Europe 
does every day.
You will excuse me if I do not go into the details 
of the EU budget story, which is multifaceted and 
complicated. Instead, I will take the opportunity 
to share my views with this highly perceptive 
group. I will put my reflections and remarks in the 
perspective of what at least from my point of view 
is now happening in Europe and in the euro area. 
Of course, what is now happening in Europe and 
in the euro area is discussion of crises: the Greek 
crisis, the euro crisis before that, and of course the 
refugee crisis. But also discussion about the future 
of Europe, the future of European governance. 
The bestseller in this regard is, of course, the 
Five Presidents’ Report, which is about monetary 
union, but if it’s about monetary union it’s about 
the whole of Europe. I have always believed and 
I continue to believe that the euro area and the 
European Union are two sides of the same coin, 
so one of the themes that should be taken up 
by the debate at the political level, and also the 
3  The intervention by Mr. Padoan is also available on You 
Tube at https://youtu.be/zBnyZmlHuJU  
technical level, is how we should make the best of 
the European project. 
Of course, the European project is going through 
a difficult phase, not only because there are crises 
to deal with but also because we have never really 
recovered from the financial crisis. This is why we 
are still seeing sluggish growth, persistent high 
unemployment and deflation around the corner. 
Europe needs to do better, not just because its 
macro-economic numbers have to improve but 
because European citizens are getting tired of 
not seeing good numbers. In fact, the numbers 
they look at are: Am I going to get a job? Is my 
son going to get a job? And what about the State? 
Is the State helping me? Is it providing welfare or 
not? Of course, this has much to do with national 
budgets, with national money. The question is: 
What can the European budget – which as you all 
know is tiny – do, and does it make a difference? 
I think it makes a lot of difference, and I think it 
could make much more difference because there 
is often, in European dialogue, conversations and 
political exchange, the risk that national solutions 
will prevail and a European solution will be 
missing. Therefore, in many areas we need to take 
Europe seriously and say ‘This is the list of the 28 
Member States’ requests, which hardly add up in 
a coherent ex-ante way, but here is a high-level 
European solution, which should be a high-level 
compromise between the national solutions. The 
EU budget is exactly one of those instruments that 
can make a difference, because we must look at the 
EU’s added value. 
This is my first point, and it has much to do with 
the debate about the future of monetary union 
for the following reason. The future of monetary 
union is largely, if not completely, related to 
progress in institution-building: how we improve 
the governance of monetary union. The debate 
about the EU budget should be exactly the same 
question, but adjusted to geography. What is the 
future of the institutions in the EU and how do 
3they fit with the rest of the institutions? Therefore, 
from this point of view, I think that since the time 
is right to discuss the future of monetary union at 
the political level, the time is right to discuss the 
rest of the European Union’s institutions. 
I understand that this goes against the need to 
solve daily or yearly problems and to fix the 
budget – this is the right time of year. At the same 
time, we cannot simply say that closing the budget 
is the end of our task. We must make a strong 
effort to link the immediate challenge of finding a 
budgetary solution, in all its detail, and rule-based 
mechanisms with a longer-term perspective. 
This is the first point that should be made when we 
discuss the future of the EU institutions nowadays. 
There is a risk that I see in the monetary union 
debate. It is that what countries, governments 
and ministers agree to do is only about the short 
term, because the long term is too long, is too far 
away, and in many cases involves treaty changes, 
so it is very difficult politically. I think we should 
overcome this temptation and should, albeit 
prudently and cooperatively, try to identify a 
long-term vision for the future of the European 
institutions. This is again where I think the EU 
budget can provide added value, as is already the 
case in many situations. As you all know, the EU 
budget finances initiatives, promotes EU-wide 
growth and employment, and fosters research 
projects, trans-European networks, economic 
and social cohesion, sustainability of natural 
environmental resources and so on. This means 
that the instrument is going in the right direction. 
But what about the future? 
Here – and this is my second point – the answer 
about the future is related to our view on where 
the European economy stands, and, as I have 
mentioned, the EU economy stands in an unhappy 
place. We cannot be satisfied with muddling 
through, because political and social support 
for the European idea, politics and machinery is 
simply losing ground in all our countries. And 
although eurosceptics – I apologise for using 
that word here – have different colours on their 
shirts and flags, in the end they may simply unite 
against any EU idea because of the mere fact that 
a European solution is seen as part of the problem 
rather than a solution, and I am deeply concerned 
about this. 
This is the task that I see for the policy-making 
community in Europe, which includes not just 
official policy makers, but all those who work on 
Europe and are thinking about how to improve 
it. This is the challenge. We cannot simply accept 
muddling through because muddling through – 
also in future crises – will not lead us anywhere, 
and will certainly not solve the problems of future 
generations. 
A few words about the economic strategy to see 
how in my view the EU budget could contribute. 
What is the EU growth strategy today, apart 
from national policies? What is the mantra that 
Finance Ministers repeat to each other when they 
meet? Well, first of all, that Europe needs more 
investment. The question is: What can public 
instruments do? And the obvious answer is the 
Juncker plan. The Juncker plan is, as I understand 
it at least, exactly a marginal contribution by the 
public in terms of risk-taking, so that the overall 
global private sector response to investment is 
enhanced and magnified, multiplied. There is a 
role for public money, public resources and public 
leadership, so that the public sector can lead the 
private sector in areas where risk-taking is ex ante 
seen as excessive, but can become acceptable if the 
risk gap is filled by a public intervention. So this is 
by definition intrinsically strategic. 
Therefore, a first point is that we already have 
an instrument in place that can further play a 
strategic role which could change the climate. The 
second point is that if we agree that this is for the 
long term and not the short term, then it has much 
to do with the structural agenda. Now, under the 
structural agenda you can imagine a long and 
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4diversified list of things to do. Structural reforms 
go from public administration to the labour 
market, but also involve all those things that are 
needed to boost a knowledge-based economy. The 
education system is for me a key structural factor, 
if not the most important structural factor, to 
boost growth. 
Thirdly, how can public activity, public leadership, 
including public resources at the EU level, boost 
the structural agenda? Structural reforms can 
benefit from financial support, especially during 
the implementation stage because of adjustment 
costs. Structural reforms at the national level can 
benefit if the structural agenda at the EU level 
is enhanced. What I have in mind is a blend of 
old things like the single market and maybe new 
things like capital market union. 
What has the budget got to do with this? Well, 
I don’t want to enter into details, but in some 
cases resources can be thought of as supporting 
structural initiatives – not just traditional 
structural initiatives such as infrastructure – 
which is very important – but also other kinds of 
structural reform which would initially benefit 
in terms of picking up, of implementation, from 
additional financial resources which sometimes 
are not available in the national budget. 
The EU resources included in the EU budget are 
already aimed at this, but maybe they could be 
tailored a little bit more to the structural reform 
agendas of individual countries. These have to 
be country-specific, but they also have a lot of 
overlap. One obvious point is that if a country 
is successful in a structural reform agenda, the 
neighbouring countries will benefit. This is 
because if we believe that structural reform boosts 
your growth potential, then this overflows and 
spills over to your neighbour. There is therefore 
scope for a renewed structural agenda at the EU 
level, including good old single market initiatives. 
However, I am not going to go into detail.
Still under the heading of structural reforms, 
where would I like to see European growth in the 
long term? Where it belongs – at the leading edge 
of technology. Europe cannot be a follower. Europe 
has to be a leader and it can be a leader. It is not 
a leader all the time for one very simple reason: 
because it isn’t Europe. Again, I am sorry to be so 
naive, but the basic idea of where growth comes 
from in Europe remains valid, and that is that 
more growth comes from more integration. And 
more integration, when we talk about technology, 
implies building up a Europe-wide system which 
puts the minds of Europeans, especially young 
Europeans, in the best possible position to build 
their knowledge and exploit it so that it becomes 
system-wide action. This means not just improving 
the education system but connecting the education 
system to the business community, and finding 
financial, fiscal and regulatory instruments to 
facilitate it. This may sound very US-like. It is, but 
we can learn from good practices. And we have 
to do it at the European level. Different countries 
in the EU perform differently as knowledge-based 
economies. I am not satisfied. I want a European 
level knowledge-based strategy. 
So, this is where I would like to see a larger role 
for EU resources, at least in terms of philosophy, 
also because Finance Ministers should always 
bear in mind that resources are limited. There is 
therefore an issue of priority. Where should we put 
the money? The money should be put where the 
marginal contribution is highest. 
In a situation of rapid change, including 
technological change, setting priorities becomes 
even more difficult, because priorities may be in 
areas where you are not used to looking – skills 
that you are not able to understand today but 
which will be needed tomorrow or in the short 
term. We need systems at the European level which 
maximize the probability that the right people get 
the right skills when they are interacting with the 
business community, for instance. 
Therefore, setting priorities is very complex. This 
brings us to another element in which the impact 
of the public-sector contribution can be very 
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5important, and this time it is directed towards the 
public sector. One of the problems with public 
administration, certainly in my own country, 
when we talk about investments, is certainly 
resources, but more importantly is projects. 
So another element which can generate a huge 
increase in added value is the capacity of public 
administration, possibly in collaboration with the 
private sector, to develop and implement good 
projects. 
This means that, beyond the amount of resources 
that the budget can provide, what is even more 
important is to contribute to the selection and 
training process in public administrations. This 
would magnify the role of the budget.
Let me try to go a bit further. All the things that I 
have mentioned, if they have any value at all, in my 
view can be achieved without major institutional 
changes. It’s about redefining strategies and about 
having the political support to do so. But we should 
not stop there. Like very much in the debate about 
the future of monetary union, one can think 
outside the box and imagine that the budget 
instrument can be transformed or expanded into 
other things. One obvious element I must put on 
the table is the idea of a eurozone budget, and I 
would like to see it not as a separate entity but as 
a component of a possibly reinforced EU budget. 
These two elements should be one thing because 
we have to develop much more and exploit much 
more the interaction between the euro area and 
the rest of the EU in ways that can be extremely 
powerful and helpful both for the ins and outs. So, 
a euro area budget within the domain of the EU 
budget could be an idea. To do what? 
Here I will again be very simple and introduce a 
very well-known concept: providing resources 
for more risk sharing. I will come back to this. 
When I went to economics school, we studied 
optimum currency areas. One concept which was 
not believed to be an implied concept was exactly 
risk sharing. If you are a monetary union, you 
need to allow for an asymmetric shock to be dealt 
with. And this of course has to do with financial 
issues. It is very much at the heart of the debate 
about banking union nowadays. But, as far as I am 
concerned, I would very much like to see – and I 
have said this publicly, so I’m not saying anything 
new – the concept of risk sharing extended to the 
labour market, which is a key component of a 
well-functioning monetary union. 
Again, the traditional theory of optimum currency 
areas starts by asking the question whether the 
labour markets are flexible enough to deal with 
giving up national currencies. It doesn’t start with 
banks, it starts with labour markets. We have 
totally forgotten this in setting up the EU. Why am 
I saying this? Because it is another way in which 
the budget instrument can provide very powerful 
inputs to conversations about monetary union 
and the model of European economic governance. 
We must exploit these elements. 
If you go down this line, you can think of other 
EU budget chapters which need to be exploited 
in this way, like guarantees of national budgets, 
and eventually the so-called euro bonds, and this 
in view to find projects which are worth studying 
and which are worth also being financed with EU 
budget guarantees. Also, on the financing side, 
I don’t want to enter into the details, but I’ll just 
mention one thing which comes more from my 
current experience than from my reflections at 
a more scholarly level: tax issues are extremely 
sensitive, domestically and around the Ecofin 
table. 
Does this mean that the word taxes cannot even be 
pronounced? I am a little less pessimistic now than 
I used to be. There are a number of areas where, 
partly thanks to the crisis, countries are beginning 
to recognize that having a European dimension 
may be good and I have two areas in mind: one is 
an automatic exchange of information which has 
to do not so much with tax but with tax evasion, 
which is the other side of the story: how to deal 
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6with a revenue problem. Another is still in the 
making, but as my country is part of the group 
working on it I cannot avoid mentioning it: the 
Financial Transaction Tax (FTT). The agenda is 
very difficult, very instructive, but still there, and I 
am still hopeful that the 11 countries in enhanced 
cooperation can close the deal soon. Such a deal 
will change the picture. The rest of the countries 
will be facing the idea that cooperation on tax 
matters can be achieved, and this may change 
their attitudes in one way or the other, and this 
of course will introduce a question: We have a 
common taxing instrument, what do we do with 
the revenue? Is there a scope for European tax? 
This is very much still in the air, but things are 
changing because this is no more an academic 
debate. 
My final point. The political dimension, which 
is essential, and my way of reading the political 
debate – be it on banking union stories, be it on 
budget stories, be it on employment insurance 
mechanisms – to make a complicated story short, 
boils down to the following: what are the drivers 
of change in European governance? 
There is one driver which is very important to 
some countries, and some very good friends of 
mine who happen to be Finance Ministers in other 
countries, which goes under the name of ‘moral 
hazard.’ The problem with Europe is that your 
neighbour may be cheating you or may be thinking 
of cheating you, so basically it’s a lack of trust 
problem. This is something you can feel in some 
meetings, but that, of course, leads nowhere. The 
political dimension is not about having leadership, 
in some cases. Leadership is there, but the fact is 
that leadership does not wish to apply itself in 
situations where there is no trust. Therefore, the 
issue is that moral hazard, fighting moral hazard 
and introducing regulations and constraints to 
avoid or to minimize the problems generated by 
moral hazard is what drives institution-building, 
because we have a big trust problem. My point is 
that this is not enough. It is only part of the story. 
The other part, as I have mentioned already, is risk-
sharing. We have to trust each other because we 
need to do things together. We are not countries 
A, B and C; we all are Europeans. 
One single example is the Single Resolution Fund, 
which is a pot of money where money comes in 
slowly with a national flag attached. After a few 
years in that bucket it comes out with a European 
flag, so it becomes something that country A 
cannot claim as its own money because everyone 
can claim some of that money according to a 
common rule. This is about risk-sharing. If you 
don’t trust you neighbour, you are not going to 
put money in the pot, because you’re afraid that 
your neighbour will take it away from you and, of 
course, you’ll have big domestic political consensus 
problems: how can I justify this to my voters? This 
is very much everyday political discussion. We 
therefore need to find a way through: the ‘moral 
hazard’ story is there, but it’s side by side with the 
‘risk-sharing story’ and one way of thinking about 
it is that if you find moral hazard then you’ll feel 
reassured about exploring risk-sharing activities. 
At the same time, if you see that there are risk-
sharing activities in instruments which have been 
set in place, then you are more willing to give up 
the option of being undisciplined and therefore 
are more able to reassure your neighbour that you 
are not going to cheat him. 
This sounds very abstract and theoretical, but, 
believe me, in my experience this is what you feel 
behind the formal statement: do this and do that; it 
is about whether I trust you or not. And this is very 
much the essence of any European initiative, be it 
money, banking, budget, you name it. And this for 
me is the situation we are in today, because this is 
the result of the crisis. One of the consequences 
of the great euro-area crisis, which is a systemic 
crisis, is exactly a destruction of trust. Three years 
ago, the markets were facing the risk of a break-
up of the euro. We had a European currency 
and at the same time national money markets, 
all denominated in the same currency. How can 
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7you do that? Well, this is exactly the symptom of 
mutual trust breaking up: at the end of the day 
money is about trust. You have to overcome this, 
but the crisis has produced another impact, which 
is the traditional impact of crises: if you survive 
the crisis you take it as an opportunity for change. 
I would like to end on this glass-half-full note by 
saying that this crisis has generated an impetus for 
building institutions together. So, my final remark 
is, as usual, do not waste a good crisis. 
Thank you.
KEYNOTE - Pier Carlo Padoan
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AN EU BUDGET FOR 
RESULTS
 by Kristalina Georgieva4 
Former Vice President of the Commission
I will start mentioning the changes in the 
Commission and from there I will lead into today’s 
topic: how we can make the budget more effective, 
more efficient and more aligned with European 
added value. 
The Juncker Commission has introduced an 
important change in terms of functionality and 
structure, transforming the vice-presidents from a 
title into a function. In the previous Commission 
we had vice-presidents, but vice-president was 
a title and a kind of seniority. However, a vice-
president had the same – maybe more important 
– single-issue portfolio and no responsibility to 
coordinate others. 
During the previous Commission, we very 
badly needed to create a horizontal coordination 
capacity. It was time for the whole to become 
bigger than the sum of the individual parts. For 
this reason, I was offered the position of one of 
the two vice-presidents that coordinate across all 
the commissioners, because I am responsible for 
human and financial resources, and of course for 
everybody to do their job this is what they need. 
The other coordinator is First Vice-president 
Timmermans.
Equally important is the fact that we now have 
cluster divisions and vice-presidents that have 
responsibility to lead in the new Commission’s 
priority areas. I also find it incredibly important 
for Europe that we are moving in a world of small 
sets of clear priorities. In our case, we came with 
10 priorities. You have all heard about them. I 
think that they are very sensible, because they 
4  The intervention by Mrs. Georgieva is also available on 
You Tube at https://youtu.be/BG79W_fRh0E 
are about investment, jobs and growth, and 
deepening and broadening the internal market. 
We know that this has been our strongest source 
of competitiveness and continues to be so. It is 
expanding our opportunities in terms of trade, 
especially vis-à-vis the United States, the TTIP 
coming up with it, the area of migration, and soon 
in the mandate that has become an overwhelming 
priority, and also touches on democracy: what is 
called the democratic deficit in Europe. 
So where is budget in all this? I think the way we 
approach our budget, how we raise money, how 
we spend money and how we account for money 
are all extremely relevant in underpinning this 
shift towards priorities and collective deployment 
towards these Commission priorities. In the very 
first days of the Commission, we adopted as one 
of our transformative objectives what we called 
a ‘budget focused on results.’ I want to give a 
little explanation of the terminology. When we 
stepped into this discussion, the term that had 
been floating around was ‘better spending’ and 
I see that tomorrow we will be discussing ‘better 
spending.’ You may ask yourselves why we are not 
calling it ‘better spending’ but instead a ‘budget 
focused on results.’ The reason is that during 
the MFF negotiations quite a lot of significance 
was acquired by certain terms. Among these, 
‘flexibility’ and ‘better spending’ are probably at 
the top of the list. ‘Flexibility’ was perceived by 
the so-called net payers to mean more money 
and ‘better spending’ was perceived by the net 
recipients to mean less money. We needed to get 
away from terms that had become loaded one way 
or another by the negotiations, and the result is a 
‘budget focused on results.’ It is actually a clear and 
well-organizing term. 
Let me first stress that we have not come to this 
‘focus on results’ from nowhere. In the presentations 
in the previous session, we heard comparisons 
between the previous programming periods and 
the one we entered in 2014. Fortunately, by and 
large they were overall positive comparisons. The 
9new programming period is much more oriented 
towards performance and this orientation is done 
in three ways. First, in programmes and projects 
we now require indicators of performance. You 
cannot simply get money; you have to say up-front 
what you are going to achieve with the money. 
These performance indicators are now penetrating 
all the partnership agreements and programmes 
that are put out. 
Second, we have introduced macro-economic 
conditionality. Minister Padoan spoke about 
structural reforms and their link with the budget, 
and I want to emphasize this point. If we are using 
the budget to create a programme to support, say, 
labour market job creation but it is placed in a 
labour market that is completely dysfunctional, 
where there are all kinds of distortions, then we are 
actually wasting money. Therefore, when we fund 
programmes, we have to align, we have to make 
sure that the programmes are implemented within 
macro-economic contexts, within structural 
contexts, that are actually conducive for positive 
results and money is not thrown into a kind of big 
black hole. 
Third, we have introduced performance reserves. 
This is a very important instrument. It is an 
incentive, so if you do the right thing you get 
rewarded. In the cohesion funds, it is 6% of the 
funding. However, we also have to be very clear, 
as we heard in the presentations, that this is the 
beginning and not the end of the road. In fact, my 
expectation is that it will take all the time of our 
term and then we will see a real systemic change 
implemented in the next MFF. During this period, 
we will make improvements. Maybe during the 
mid-term review there will be some elements of 
the systemic change introduced, but shifts of this 
kind – what we are talking about here is quite 
dramatic in terms of how we use the EU budget 
– are going to take time. We must be sure to not 
create false expectations and clear that the shift to 
performance, results and outcomes is not going to 
happen overnight. 
Why do we have to be so cautious? Partly, because 
if we do it recklessly we may cause more damage 
than good. I still remember my old days at the 
World Bank, where there was a push for results 
and one of the unintended consequences was 
that people shifted money towards things that are 
easy to measure. Putting kids in schools is easy to 
measure, and it is a good thing, but you should 
not forget that there is infrastructure to be built, 
and that there are innovations to be stimulated 
where it is much more difficult to create a simple 
indicator. We also have a very big problem with 
the enthusiasm that we have created for the new 
programming period. We now have flowers 
blooming everywhere but we are trying to make 
sense of the indicators that are being introduced in 
projects and programmes, and the result is that my 
colleagues in DG Budget are pulling out their hair 
because although we now have lots of indicators 
it is not necessarily easy to lump them together or 
to use them as clear drivers of everything, because 
they are not very compatible and sometimes there 
are too many of them. 
When I talk about these difficulties it is not to 
stifle my colleagues’ enthusiasm. On the contrary, 
one of the best groups in which a vice-president 
has a role is the group we have created on a budget 
focused on results. We have all the big spenders 
in this group, inside and outside the European 
Union, together with the key vice-presidents that 
are dealing with macro-economic conditionality, 
so we can align the budget and the policy advice. 
What does this work on a budget focused on 
results consist of in a nutshell? What exactly are 
we working towards? We now have an agreed 
framework within which we work and it consists 
of four parts: where we spend, how we spend, how 
we are assessed, and how we communicate the 
results. 
On the first question of where we spend, obviously 
we are saying ‘Ok, if these are our priorities, the 
budget has to be aligned with the priorities. If 
creating jobs and growth is a priority, we have to see 
AN EU BUDGET FOR RESULTS - Kristalina Georgieva
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an increase in the budget going in that direction. 
If dealing with the refugee crisis is a priority, we 
have to see the budget lifted up in this direction. 
In fact, we made our first budget proposal as a 
new Commission in the May 2016 draft budget. 
It had three areas of significant increase and 
they were exactly these three: jobs and growth; 
competitiveness; migration and external action 
helping people in the places that they are running 
away from. Interestingly enough, when we put 
this budget to the Parliament and the Member 
States, what did the Member States do with our 
proposal at the first reading? Any guesses? Chop 
chop. And where did they do that? Obviously in 
the areas that are not in the moral hazard field of 
‘what do I put in, what do I get out?’ They did not 
touch the approximately 80% that was going into 
national envelopes; they oriented the cuts outside 
of the national envelopes. This is now changing, 
and I want to say very clearly that there is a great 
deal of sobriety and focus today in the context of 
the refugee crisis, which creates an opportunity to 
rethink how we work, how we use the budget. We 
are much more focused on horizontal alignment, 
something that has traditionally been a weak 
spot. We look at components in different parts 
of the budget and then see how they connect 
in a territorial context, or in terms of priorities. 
That is, if you take an Italian region and there are 
agriculture funds, Horizon 2020 and structural 
cohesion funds, how do all these work towards 
the bigger objectives for Italy? How do they 
connect? This connectivity is like totally common 
sense, but what do we know about common 
sense? It is not very common! It had not really 
been done systematically but we are now seeing 
much traction in that direction. Moreover, in 
a much more dramatic way, we are thinking of 
changing the construct of grants versus loans and 
other financial instruments within the budget. 
Traditionally, the European budget has consisted 
of grants and it has traditionally been loved for 
that. Who does not like free money? If somebody 
gives you free money, you take it and you say why 
‘don’t you give me more?’ This has been pushing 
the share of the EU budget in projects up to the 
point where now we have 100% of EU funding 
implemented for Greece. I think we should be 
creating much more responsibility by bringing 
down the EU grant component 
On the question of grants, today 92% of the EU 
budget consists of grants and we have introduced 
the EFSI, European Funds for Strategic 
Investments, which is taking a chunk from the 
budget and using it to draw in private sector 
money by reducing the risk – Minister Padoan has 
talked about it – by using it as a risk-suppression 
mechanism, because what is blocking investment 
in Europe to a great degree is this perception of a 
high level of risk. We would not like to abandon 
grants because there are many projects that you 
have to do with grant money, such as if you are 
investing in a rural school, but there are many 
projects where we have been misaligning the 
instruments with the objective.
Then comes the question of efficiency, which leads 
me on to how we spend. For the sake of focusing 
our minds, I will limit my comments to one issue: 
the still excessive bureaucratic wrangling over the 
way we manage our programmes. I have talked 
to some good friends who have access to money 
who say to me ‘Your EU budget, Kristalina, thank 
you, but no thank you. You are more trouble than I 
want to swallow.’ This is terrible, because we should 
not be perceived as a source of trouble; we should 
be perceived as a source of inspiration, of values, 
of an ability to lift up Europe collectively, clearly 
defining the additionality that we bring with 
our money, but also working on simplification, 
day in, day out. We also have much work to do 
with the Parliament and the Court of Auditors, 
because there is of course concern that if we were 
to move too far too fast we might undermine the 
financial viability of Europe. This would mean 
shooting ourselves in the foot, because citizens 
only give us money if they believe that we use 
the money effectively. An example is that now 
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we have simplified cost options. Applicants no 
longer have to fill in multiple forms. They receive 
25% whether they buy pens, drive cars or use it 
for machinery of some kind. They know what they 
need for their office, but it is 25%. It used to be 
that they got a pen and they filled in a form. That 
is, unfortunately, how it used to be. We are moving 
towards simplification, but I am not convinced 
we have moved far enough. We are now forming 
an inter-institutional working group on a budget 
focused on results, or actually on performance-
based budgeting – slightly different things but still 
in the same area. It is absolutely paramount for us 
to have a budget that gets to where it has to be, 
one that achieves results with minimum waste and 
minimum sunk costs. Let me put it that way. 
On the third question of how we are assessed, we 
have been consistently assessed mostly from the 
perspective of financial accounting, and more 
specifically the measurement that is known as the 
‘error rate.’ Of course, we have been working to 
bring down the ‘error rate’ and we will continue 
to work to do so. I am a very practical person and 
I ask myself a very simple question. If for 20 years 
in a row we have not been able to bring the ‘error 
rate’ anywhere close in shared management, while 
in direct management we do it without problems 
as we are in control, and all I can pray for is that 
we go 0.1% or 0.2% down vis-à-vis the previous 
year, is this where we should concentrate 100% 
of public attention, 100% of our efforts? For me, 
the answer is no. We should continue to strive 
to bring down the ‘error rate,’ push the Member 
States and simplify, because the Court tells us 
that simplifying cost options means fewer errors. 
We should continue to push Member States to be 
alert to take action and we should still aim for this 
2%. However, if this is going to happen for the 
next 20 years, the question is what we should do 
in the meanwhile. We have made two proposals 
to the Court and the Court has been – from the 
standpoint of my mandate – unable to accept one 
but has accepted the second one. Our first proposal 
was to concentrate on the ‘residual error rate,’ and 
I know the complications. 
I need to explain what ‘error rate’ and ‘residual error 
rate’ are. ‘Error rate’ is this. When you implement 
a project, the auditors check whether all the 
accounting for the project has been done properly. 
If there is an inappropriate entry, a mistake in an 
entry or – and this is the really bad one – there 
is abuse of the money, money has disappeared, 
then it is counted as an error. In most cases the 
error is exactly that: an error. Somebody did not 
fill in a form properly. Sometimes it is much worse 
than an error. Unfortunately, the ‘error rate’ does 
not differentiate between fraud and corruption 
and error. In the mind of the public it is all 
amalgamated as fraud, as misuse. To make things 
even worse, errors get corrected. So, you make an 
error in 2013 in a multi-year project and in 2014 
you correct it. There is no longer an error but it has 
been left in the accounting for 2013, leaving the 
impression that it is actually worse than it is by the 
end of the project. Therefore, what we are doing 
in the Commission is we are saying we should 
have multi-annuality. If a project is implemented 
over 5 years, why don’t we calculate the ‘residual 
error rate’ – what is left after all the corrections 
have been made? When we do the calculations, 
in fact, the ‘error rate’ goes down, sometimes 
very close to the 2% that the Court wants us to 
get to. Therefore, I believe – and I have been very 
up-front with the Court – that it is important to 
create an incentive for corrections to be made 
because corrections then matter and in the end 
you end up in a better place. I also believe that in 
my time as commissioner – in the next 5 years – if 
I want to see something that is in the vicinity of 
2% in shared management – those programmes 
where the Commission and the Member States 
work together – it can only be on the basis of the 
‘residual error rate.’ Obviously I am mindful that 
for the Court this is not easy. In fact, the Court 
says it is not possible but I also hope that the Court 
will understand our position. In the end, what 
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matters is for projects to be implemented in the 
best possible way, from A to Z. 
And then comes performance, where the Court 
and the Commission are on the same page. The 
Court is now looking keen on performance and we 
are looking keen on performance and we feel very 
strongly that we have to work together on defining 
what exactly performance is and that is not a 
simple and straightforward conversation, because 
how you measure input is easy – you put money 
in; how you measure outputs, outcomes, results 
and impact is a very, very different conversation. 
We have to continue to work relentlessly.
Finally, there is the question of how we 
communicate about what we do. I think we should 
communicate in a much more political way and in 
a much more systematic and coherent way. Today, 
we say to everybody that we are very transparent 
and it is true. Anything and everything we do 
is somewhere there, but only God knows where 
exactly because we are so complicated in the way 
that every little programme has its own website. 
Countries do one thing and we do another. Our 
Director Generals have programmes and each one 
says ‘Oh, that’s me, stay away!’ which creates an 
impossibility of communicating. We want to get 
to a point where we do systematic studies. For 
example, this has been done for the impact of 
cohesion programmes on trade growth in three 
countries: Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. This study 
concluded that cohesion funding has increased 
the GDP in Latvia by 2.1%, in Lithuania by 1.8%, 
and in Poland by 1.7%. But this is one little slice, 
one study. How do we get to the point where we 
look at this kind of aggregate political results? We 
did something at the first conference on a budget 
focused on results, a database in which we now 
have 5 countries and 18 projects that presents 
what was spent and what the results are in a more 
or less systematic and comprehensive manner. 
We should have made a demonstration, but it is 
too late for that now. I didn’t think of it earlier. 
However, it is possible to see it. 
I want to conclude by saying we are in a hugely 
difficult place as a world. Not us as Europe, but as 
a world. Here in Europe we have our additional 
complexities. We have a tendency in Europe 
to focus on our belly button and just talk about 
ourselves, which is understandable because we 
are a young union. However, in this very tough 
place, the world in which we are, unless we 
dramatically change the conversation with our 
people to one in which we are clear about what is 
at stake at the high political level – our ability to 
be a competitive region – and then translate this 
overarching objective into what it means for what 
we do with the budget and what it means for each 
and every one of us in the Commission and in 
the Parliament, then I think we will be in a tough 
place. However, like the Minister I believe that we 
have a crisis that is a fabulous crisis. It is not to be 
missed and we can come out of it much stronger.
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THE PERCEPTION OF 
THE EU BUDGET
 by Maria Lodovica Agro
Director General of the Italian Agency for 
Territorial Cohesion  
General objective
The EU Budget accounts for only 1% of Gross 
National Income, but its impact on the economy 
is definitely higher because of its leverage effects. 
How could the EU budget be more result-oriented, 
enhancing its efficiency and effectiveness? 
Improving the quality of expenditure is the 
challenge of the coming years. This Workshop 
will seek to provide an answer to this question by 
drawing on the experience of EU fund beneficiaries 
and comments provided by academics and 
professionals.
Panel 1: How are EU Budget 
contributions perceived by their 
beneficiaries? 
As Director General of Italy’s newly established 
Agency for Territorial Cohesion, the issues 
debated today are of the utmost relevance to my 
everyday activity, and to Italy, a net contributor 
to the EU budget. Being aware of the increased 
complexity of implementation, through the 
Agency Italy wishes to ensure it has a Cohesion 
Policy. That is, a policy with a seven-year period to 
reach results, effectiveness, strengthened support 
for its implementation and supervision, and to 
successfully meet the challenge set by the 2014-
2020 programming cycle.
My intervention will seek to assess how 
beneficiaries perceive the regulatory innovations 
concerning the implementation mechanisms 
introduced in the 2014-2020 programming cycle.
First of all, it is worth specifying that the term 
‘beneficiary’ means a public or private body; 
only for the purposes of the European EAFRD 
Regulation and of the EMFF Regulation, it 
means a natural person who is responsible for the 
initiating or both the initiating and implementing 
operations; in the context of state aid schemes, it is 
the body which receives the aid; and in the context 
of financial instruments, it means the body that 
implements the financial instrument or the fund 
of funds as appropriate: a varied set of categories.
Changes introduced by the 
Financial and General Regulations
From the point of view of implementation 
mechanisms, the 2014-2020 programming cycle is 
characterised by a strongly enhanced management 
and control system compared to the previous 
programming cycle as a direct result of Article 
59 (shared management with Member States) 
and Article 80 (rules on recovery) of the new EU 
Financial Regulation.5
The significant points in the proposed Financial 
Regulation concern the introduction of 
annual financial management of programmes, 
a strengthened control chain, alignment of 
accounting and reporting on financial management, 
and a positive statement of assurance  of the 
regularity of  accounts by the European Court of 
Auditors (ECA). These innovations result in a 
significant alignment of Cohesion Policy financial 
management with Common Agricultural Policy 
rules, although in 2010 the European Court 
of Auditors itself observed that “replicating 
the administrative arrangements surrounding 
agricultural payments will not necessarily be easy. 
Nor can it be assumed that the change proposed 
will automatically transfer to other parts of the 
budget the apparent strengths of the current 
system for dealing with agricultural spending” 
and that “around 70 % of expenditure should be 
calculated not on the basis of cost reimbursement 
5  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 966/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial 
rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2012.
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but on the basis of objective criteria e.g. land 
eligible for Single Payment Scheme payments.”6
A further innovation is introduced by Article 2 of 
the General Regulation,7 which defines two annual 
cycles governing the 2014-2020 programming 
period, namely:
• The accounting year, i.e. the period from 1 
July to 30 June, except for the first accounting 
year of the programming period, in respect 
of which it means the period from the start 
date of eligibility for expenditure until 30 June 
2015. The final accounting year will be from 1 
July 2023 to 30 June 2024; 
• The financial year, i.e. the period from 1 
January to 31 December.
The accounting year is applicable to the financial 
management of a programme; the financial year 
is related to the execution of the EU Budget. The 
former, therefore, regulates annual accounts.
The introduction of the accounting year results in 
a marked tightening of the financial procedures 
for programmes.
The result of the entire legislative package confirms 
that the financial management of multi-annual 
policies will be carried out on an annual basis, with 
an ensuing introduction of new responsibilities. 
The reference to the accounting year and the 
closure of annual accounts may also have an 
effect – the scope of which we cannot assess at the 
moment – on the current mechanism for selecting/
deselecting projects within a given programme. 
6 Opinion No. 6/2010 on a proposal for a regulation by the 
European Parliament and the Council on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of the European Union (2010/C 
334/01).
7 Regulation (EU) No.  1303/2013 by the European 
Parliament and by the Council of 17 December 2013, laying down 
common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, 
the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions 
on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social 
Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries 
Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006. 
How will this affect ‘beneficiaries’? How will they 
perceive the value that EU contributions can bring 
to development and employment? Certainly, the 
changes to implementing mechanisms (as set out 
above) cannot fail to impact beneficiaries as they 
represent a major component of the management 
and control system. Such repercussions may result 
in a need to select beneficiaries that can assure 
the authorities in charge of programmes that they 
will meet financial management time constraints, 
even at the expense of beneficiaries, selection of 
whom involves too risky an innovation rate with 
respect to financial constraints. Also with regard 
to financial management time constraints, the 
selection of operations should be oriented towards 
‘quick’ execution operations, thus significantly 
favouring implementation efficiency even over 
effectiveness on the ground. It should be ensured 
that the result will lie in “more finance and less 
economy.”
It is worth pointing out that within EU policies 
other than the Cohesion Policy (all characterised 
by direct management), administrative complexity 
is certainly more limited, probably because 
expenditure is calculated not on the basis of the 
cost reimbursement principle, but on the basis of 
objective criteria, e.g. land eligible for aid under 
the CAP single payment scheme.
Being aware of the increased complexity of 
implementation, Italy has created the necessary 
tools to successfully meet the challenge set by the 
2014-2020 programming cycle.
Partnership Agreement innovations 
and governance strengthening
At the level of each Member State, the Partnership 
Agreement defines: development needs; 
programming thematic objectives; and the 
expected results and actions to be implemented 
through the use of structural funds. The laying 
down of the strategy document was launched in 
December 2012, defining the methodological 
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framework for the new cycle, and identifying the 
innovations necessary to enhance efficiency and 
the quality of fund expenditure.
The 2014-2020 Cohesion Policy legislative 
package introduces major changes, such as greater 
programming coordination of the four EU funds 
linked to the 2014-2020 Common Strategic 
Framework in a single strategy document, as 
well as strong consistency with the Europe 2020 
objectives of a smart, inclusive and sustainable 
growth of the EU. The budget supports this 
approach.
The main methodological innovations proposed 
are:8
1. Expected results, expressed in measurable 
terms by means of quantitative indicators of 
the impact on citizens’ lives of government 
interventions;
2. Binding timing, explicitly associated with the 
parties responsible for meeting deadlines;
3. Mobilised partnership, to be promptly 
involved in the processes leading to 
policy decision-making during both the 
programming and implementation phases.
On the methodological basis thus defined, 
in a very extensive prime consultation phase 
partnership discussions were set up to lay down 
the Partnership Agreement, with four thematic 
tables arranged by grouping the eleven objectives 
of the new EU Regulation:
8  The others are: 1. Actions, to be indicated in punctual 
and operational terms; 2. Transparency, through dialogue with 
the territories concerned and through open data; 3. Assessment 
of the effects produced by co-financed development projects and 
how such effects will take place; 4. Enhanced national supervision 
of implementation, through systematic monitoring of co-financed 
programmes and on-site verifications to ascertain the state of 
interventions, support and structured assistance from national 
competence centres to the implementing authorities, in the most 
critical situations.
1. Work, competitiveness of production systems 
and innovation;
2. Enhancement, management and protection of 
the environment;
3. Quality of life and social inclusion;
4. Education, training and skills, by holding 
thematic hearings involving more than six 
hundred subjects.
The extensive discussion phase allowed the 
‘expected results based on indicators-actions’ 
combination for each of the thematic objectives 
covered by the regulation to be defined according 
to the common methodology. A proposal was thus 
drawn up for intense discussion with the regions 
over the articulation of the strategy at the regional 
level. The formal negotiations ended on 29 
October 2014 with the adoption of the Partnership 
Agreement by the European Commission.
Italy’s Partnership Agreement implements and 
develops the changes introduced by the 2014-
2020 legislative package, first by shifting the 
programming focus onto results, with the aim of 
achieving more efficient and effective expenditure 
of both national and EU resources.
The Partnership Agreement pattern of “expected 
results and actions” responds to the need to 
explain in a more timely, clear and concrete way 
the choices of intervention selected (duly laid 
down in the operational programmes) in order 
to improve transparency, ongoing accountability 
and control of the quality of co-financed 
investments. Hence the decision to complement 
Italy’s partnership agreement with the Expected 
Results-Actions scheme (not required by EU 
Regulations), which identifies for each single 
intervention area (thematic objective) of the 
funds the results expected from the programmed 
investments, coupled with relevant indicators, and 
the individual actions to be undertaken to obtain 
these expected results.
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Italy’s programming document provides for 
important choices in the concentration of the 
funds available. The share of resources allocated to 
the thematic objectives linked to the Europe 2020 
Strategy (research and innovation, production 
system competitiveness, digitization, energy and 
sustainable mobility, social inclusion) has been 
increased with respect to the thresholds set by 
the EU regulations (so-called ‘ring-fencing’), and 
resources are allocated for significantly higher 
amounts than the minimum required by the 
EU regulations (33.6% compared to 26.5%) for 
European Social Fund (ESF) interventions aimed 
at supporting employment and strengthening 
human capital and social inclusion (thematic 
objectives 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the ESF). Investment 
priorities were identified taking into account the 
Country-Specific Recommendations issued by the 
Council of the European Union in July 2014 for 
areas relevant to the Cohesion Policy on the basis of 
the National Reform Programme (notably market 
interventions, schools, infrastructure, regulatory 
framework simplification, strengthening of 
administrative capacity). The strategic choices also 
aim to address key territorial challenges (in inner-
city, urban and rural areas) to reduce internal 
imbalances, taking into account useful leverages 
in the territories concerned.
Furthermore, the regulatory 
provision establishing ad-
hoc dedicated bodies (i.e. 
Italy’s Agency for Territorial 
Cohesion and the Department 
within the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers) that 
focus on different segments of 
the definition of the Cohesion 
Policy and the programming 
and implementation of the 
ensuing interventions is aimed 
at governance strengthening. 
Hence, both the Agency and 
the Department are aimed 
at the effectiveness of the 
Cohesion Policy, both by performing guidance, 
programming and coordination functions and 
by strengthening support for its implementation 
and supervision, in order to consolidate the 
result-oriented programming approach, enhance 
investment quality and improve the absorption 
capacity of funds.
Italy: net contributor to the EU 
budget
The main item (a percentage hovering around 
70%) in the revenue for the EU Budget concerns 
Gross National Income (GNI). On the basis of this 
parameter, the Member States that most contribute 
to the EU Budget are the richest and largest ones. 
Thus, in terms of revenue Italy was the third main 
contributor in 2014 (it would be the fourth in the 
absence of the ‘British rebate’ mechanism, which 
rests primarily on France and Italy), and the fifth 
country in terms of European budget expenditure. 
As for the balance between contributions and 
expenditure, over the last 15 years Italy has been 
a net contributor to the EU budget with the only 
exception of the year 2000, as shown in Figure 1 
below. Moreover, in 2014 Italy had the fifth largest 
negative operating budgetary balance of the ten 
such EU Member States.
Source: ACT processing of EC data – DG Budget
Figure 1
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Figure 2 below compares the trends in the main EU 
Budget items and the operating budgetary balance 
for Italy. As can be seen, there is strong correlation 
between Cohesion Policy payments and the 
balance, mainly due to the fact that the Cohesion 
Policy implementation mechanisms are more 
complex than the Common Agricultural Policy 
implementation mechanisms, i.e. agricultural 
aid is mainly granted on the basis of physical 
parameters so the payments are virtually constant 
over time, although decreasing in real terms.
Figure 2
The other part of the balance accounts for 
the overall national contribution from the 
Member State, thus it excludes traditional EU 
own resources. As mentioned, the GNI-linked 
resource is the most important and, as nominal 
sizes are involved, this resource tends to grow if 
the economy grows and/or because of inflation. 
As Figure 2 shows, while payments, which are 
also expressed in nominal terms, oscillate around 
a constant average value, the operating budgetary 
balance shows a decreasing trend, which may be 
explained by the fact that Italy’s total national 
contribution tends to increase (from EUR 9.5 
billion in 2000 to EUR 14.4 in 2014). Therefore, 
even in the absence of volatile Cohesion Policy 
payments, the operating budgetary balance would 
in any case experience a downward trend. It is 
to be noted that annual EU budget revenue has 
been increasing in nominal terms, from EUR 92.7 
billion in 2000 to EUR 143.9 in 2014.
As can be seen from Figure 3, the amounts 
allocated to Italy under the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) and the ESF in 
current values have not greatly changed between 
one programming period and the other.
Source: ACT processing of EC data – DG Budget
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Figure 3
Source: ACT processing of EU programming data
The average payment from the EU budget between 
2000 and 2014 for the Cohesion Policy amounts to 
approximately EUR 3.7 billion. The sum of EU funds 
for ERDF and ESF over the three programming 
periods amounts to approximately EUR 87 billion. 
Assuming that all three programming periods are 
concluded by 2025, then annual payments at the 
level of the previously calculated average value 
would enable, at least theoretically and with due 
caution, full use of resources.
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THE ADDED VALUE 
OF EU SPENDING
by Eulalia Rubio 
Jacques Delors Institute, Paris
What is ‘European added value’? The term is 
widely used in official documents and academic 
reflections on the EU budget, but it lacks conceptual 
clarity. The most common answer is that it is “the 
value resulting from an EU intervention which 
is additional to the value that would have been 
otherwise created by Member State action alone.”9 
But what does it mean in practice, and how does 
it apply to the EU budget? Is it just a rhetorical 
device used to justify existing EU spending or 
can it be used as a workable criterion with which 
to evaluate programmes, build consensus on 
new priorities and guide the re-allocation of EU 
funding? 
In the following, I will try to provide my view on 
the utility and relevance of ‘added value’ in current 
EU budgetary debates. I will do it by re-visiting a 
paper I wrote in 2011.10 In that paper, I analysed 
how the notion of added value was used in the 
contributions made by national governments, 
think tanks and academia to the open consultation 
launched on the occasion of the 2008-10 budgetary 
review. The analysis revealed the existence of at 
least four different ways of using ‘added value’, 
which can be summarised as follows:
1. As a criterion with which to determine the 
optimal distribution of spending assignments 
between the EU and the national level;
2. As a criterion with which to judge the 
9  This is indeed the definition provided by the Commission 
in a Staff Working Document published in 2011 (European 
Commission, The added value of the EU budget”, Staff Working 
Document SEC (2011) 867 final, 29.6.2011).
10  Rubio, Eulalia (2011) The added value in EU budgetary 
debates: one concept, four meanings, policy paper. Notre Europe – 
Jacques Delors Institute, Paris.
opportunity costs of spending in one area vis-
à-vis other policy areas of intervention; 
3. As a criterion with which to evaluate the results 
and impact of EU spending programmes;
4. As a criterion with which to evaluate the positive 
side effects of EU spending programmes 
(that is, in addition to achievement of the 
programme goals)
These four uses of added value differ along two 
dimensions:
The source of additionality: that is, whether 
additionality derives from classic economic gains 
such as benefits of scale or cross-country spillover 
benefits (cases 1 and 3) or from political or 
policy-related gains, such as the merit or political 
relevance of public intervention in a certain policy 
area or positive effects of EU spending in terms 
of visibility or improvements in national policy-
making practices (cases 2 and 4).
The way added value is used in the EU budget 
process: in particular, whether it is used at a macro-
level, to build consensus on new priorities or to 
guide major EU spending re-allocation decisions 
(cases 1 and 2), or at a micro-level, to evaluate the 
design, implementation and impact of particular 
programmes (cases 3 and 4).
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Things have changed since I wrote that paper but 
overall I think the classification is still valid. My 
perception is that some of the uses of ‘added value’ 
have lost importance, whereas others are gaining 
in relevance. Let me discuss each of these four 
meanings in detail and how relevant I believe they 
are in the current circumstances. 
1. Added value as a 
criterion to distribute 
spending assignments between 
the EU and the national 
levels
This has traditionally been the most extended use 
of ‘added value,’ at least among think tankers and 
academic experts. It is rooted in fiscal federalism. 
The classic argument is that the EU should 
finance actions whose objectives can be better 
achieved at the EU level than at national level – 
due to economies of scale, threshold effects or 
the existence of cross-national spill overs – unless 
there is major heterogeneity in policy preferences 
across member states.
The teachings of fiscal federalism are very useful, 
and we are obliged to take them into account as 
they are enshrined in EU law (with the principle 
of subsidiarity). They should be integrated, as they 
are indeed, into any ex-ante appraisal. However, 
assessments of ‘added value’ should be interpreted 
with caution given the inherent limitations of 
this type of analysis. There are basically two 
methodological problems. The first is the difficulty 
in estimating the counter-factual, e.g. how should 
we estimate the benefits and costs that would be 
created in the hypothetical situation of agriculture 
spending being decided at the national level? 
We can make comparisons with other developed 
nations but the situation is never exactly the same 
(there is no other experience of deep market 
integration in the world comparable to the single 
market). The second is the difficulty in comparing 
the ‘value’ of public interventions at different levels 
of government. We can evaluate the effectiveness 
and efficiency of EU actions against the stated 
objectives, but how should we compare the results 
of our evaluation to evaluations of national actions 
that do not necessarily share the same orientation 
and goals? Assessing the value of a policy requires 
a judgement about the desirable outcomes and 
preferences with respect to it, which might differ 
across jurisdictions, or from country to country.
In addition to these methodological limitations, I 
would argue that using ‘added value’ at a macro-
level (that is, to identify the optimal assignment 
of spending competences in a given domain) does 
not seem very useful to me. There have been many 
studies trying to do this in a rigorous way11 and 
most of them provide rather intuitive results (e.g. 
defence is an area presenting major scale benefits 
while the contrary is true for education; trans-
national infrastructure or programmes promoting 
mobility provide clear added value, etc.). These 
sorts of findings have little or no influence on 
major EU budgetary decisions, which are mostly 
driven by politics. 
2. Added value as a 
criterion to judge the 
opportunity costs of 
spending in one area vis-à-
vis other policy areas of 
intervention
In analysing the contributions to the 2009-2010 EU 
budgetary review, I identified another way of using 
‘added value’ which is a variant of the first. Some 
people made claims that EU resources should be 
shifted from one area to another on the grounds 
that the second would provide greater ‘added 
value’ for Europe. While theoretically grounded 
on fiscal federalism arguments, this is essentially 
a political argument. Ultimately, it is about 
11  e.g. Alesina et al (2005), “What does the European 
Union do?”, Public Choice (2005) 123: 275–319; Ercorys (2008), 
A study on EU spending, study commissioned by the DG Budget; 
Bassford et.al. (2013), The European Added Value of EU Spending: 
Can the EU Help its Member States to Save Money?, Exploratory 
Study, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh.
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comparing the ‘value’ of EU public intervention 
in different domains. This is subjective: if you 
conceive of Europe as essentially an economic 
project, you will consider it more important to 
increase competitiveness-enhancing spending 
items. If you see it as a societal project, you will 
attach more value to other types of spending, such 
as those supporting the transition towards a low-
carbon economy or strengthening territorial and 
social cohesion. 
3. Added value as a 
criterion to evaluate the 
results and impact of EU 
spending programmes
Added value can also be used as a criterion with 
which to assess existing programmes. Indeed, 
in the contributions to the 2009-2010 open 
consultation, many people called for more efforts 
to assess added value “on the ground.” In my 
view, this is a more interesting and potentially 
useful way of using ‘added value.’ It resonates 
with current calls to render the EU budget more 
focused on results. Indeed, a thorough evaluation 
of the results of EU spending should include an 
analysis of its additionality.
How should we integrate ‘added value’ in ex-
post evaluations? One option is to identify 
the sources of additionality justifying the EU 
intervention (scale benefits, critical mass effects, 
cross-country spillovers) and demonstrate by 
means of pre-selected illustrative examples that 
these sources of additionality are being addressed 
in the programme. This is in essence what the 
Commission does in the Staff Working Document 
accompanying the 2015 Report evaluating the 
EU’s finances.12 However, this type of exercise does 
not lead us very far. It easily ends up being a way of 
justifying existing EU programmes by re-stating 
12  European Commission, Examples of EU added value, 
Staff Working Document accompanying the Report evaluating the 
Union’s finances based on the results achieved, SWD (2015) 124 
final, 26.6.2015.
the reasons why they were originally adopted 
(already identified in the ex-ante appraisal).
Another option is to consider that EU programmes 
maximise their ‘added value’ when they deliver 
in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. This 
has sometimes been done by the European 
Commission. For instance, in its 2011 Staff 
Working Document on ‘added value’ it recorded 
the number of jobs created, railway kilometres 
financed and firms supported as part of the 
evidence that the cohesion policy entails added 
value. But this is not really a proof of additionality.
 A third option we could imagine is to generalise 
the ‘additionality’ test applied in the context of 
the EU cohesion policy. The additionality of ESI 
funds is measured by looking at trends in the 
overall level of national public investment. This 
is a necessary test to prevent risks of replacement 
in countries receiving important amounts of ESI 
funds. However, the accuracy of the measure 
is frequently put into question. Moreover, it is a 
crude aggregate measure of input additionality. 
It might be useful to assess risks of replacement 
on a large scale but it does not detect problems of 
substitution or overlaps at the level of individual 
EU programmes or measures. In my view, there is 
a need for more refined indicators of ‘additionality’ 
tailored to the characteristics of each EU spending 
programme.
In some areas (e.g. SME support schemes) 
EU actions can frequently be seen to co-exist 
with similar national interventions. In these 
cases, both ex-ante and ex-post assessments 
should systematically assess whether there are 
redundancies or overlaps with national schemes 
and the capacity to generate complementarities 
and synergies with them.13 
13  For instance, a 2011 European Court of Auditors special 
report on the SME guarantee facility highlighted that this facility 
co-habited with similar national schemes, without providing any 
qualitative differences vis-à-vis the national schemes in terms 
of scope, capacity to coordinate or financing cross-national 
investment.
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In other areas (e.g. EU foreign policy, migration) 
EU action is broadly justified in terms of scale 
benefits or cross-national effects, but there might 
be deficiencies in the design or implementation 
of the policy that result in weak additionality on 
the ground. For instance, a 2014 special report 
by the European Court of Auditors identified this 
problem in the use of the External Border Fund 
(the predecessor of the current AMIF fund). 
Although one of the top priorities of the fund was 
to develop consular cooperation, and cooperation 
actions were eligible for higher co-financing rates, 
this financial incentive proved ineffective, with 
most of the EBF funding ending up being used to 
renovate, adapt and equip national consulates.
Finally, in many areas a growing use of ‘financial 
instruments’ is expected in the years ahead. In this 
respect, it is also important to reflect on ways to 
assess possible risks of overlap and substitution 
between the EU level and national-level financial 
instruments. In a recent study we published on the 
Juncker Plan,14 we draw attention to the specific 
risk that the EIB may use the guarantee of the new 
European Fund for Strategic Investments to cover 
projects co-financed with national promotional 
banks which would have been financed anyway by 
these banks alone. 
4. Added value as a 
criterion to assess the 
positive side effects of EU 
spending interventions
In my 2011 paper, I also noticed that some people 
– particularly EU cohesion policy experts – used 
added value to refer to reported benefits from EU 
spending that are additional to achievement of 
the stated objectives. These can include somewhat 
ethereal things such as the visibility of the EU 
project or increased support for EU integration, 
but also more tangible features such as a positive 
impact on national policies and administrations. 
14  Eulalia Rubio, Thomas Pellerin-Carlin and David 
Rinaldi, Investment in Europe: making the best of the Juncker Plan. 
With cases studies on digital infrastructures and energy efficiency. 
Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, April 2016.
In particular, I argued that cohesion funding – 
through its delivery process – induces important 
policy and administrative changes at the national 
level, such as promoting long-term planning, 
diffusing a culture of evaluation, introducing 
monitoring and auditing practices, and aligning 
national policies to long-term EU goals. 
Some people dismiss this way of using ‘added value’ 
on the grounds that it is not rigorous and that it can 
ultimately serve to justify all types of spending. It 
is true that sometimes it has been used to justify 
existing cohesion envelopes against accusations 
of wasteful spending or ineffectiveness. Having 
said this, I do think this way of thinking about the 
‘added value’ of EU spending is very promising. 
It chimes well with growing calls to use the EU 
budget to support or induce positive changes in 
national policies and actions. There have already 
been some changes in the current programming 
period that go in this direction:
• An important increase in the amount of 
structural and cohesion funding devoted to 
strengthening public governance (thematic 
objective 11);
• A reinforcement and extension of 
conditionalities (macro-economic 
conditionality, systematic ex-ante 
conditionality); 
• The recent proposal to create a Structural 
Reform Support Programme, whose main 
goal would be to support reforms at the 
national level. 
Furthermore, there may be more changes in the 
future. At a recent EU conference, Wolfgang 
Shäuble called on the budget to “systematically 
use EU money to help finance the implementation 
of the political priorities which we have agreed on 
in the European Semester.”15 Of course, these are 
only the words of Mr Schäuble and they may not 
15  Speech by Dr Wolfgang Shauble at the Conference 
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even represent the official position of the German 
government. However, they are illustrative of 
a long-term vision for the EU budget that is 
dominant in certain circles. 
Can this type of ‘added value’ be an object of more 
or less rigorous assessment? Such assessment 
is challenging, but not impossible. It is similar 
to what is called ‘behavioural additionality’ in 
research on the impact of public funds on research 
and innovation, and there have been attempts to 
quantify this type of impact. At the EU level, a 
recent ESF evaluation report16 tries to capture 
this form of added value on the basis of findings 
from a set of country reports. Apart from ‘volume 
effects’ (increases in terms of funding) the report 
finds evidence of: 
• ‘scope effects ‘(cases in which ESF spending 
has broadened the scope of national action by 
supporting groups or policy areas that would 
not otherwise receive support);
• ‘role effects’ (cases in which ESF spending has 
helped to diffuse innovative practices);
• ‘process effects’ (cases in which ESF spending 
has induced changes in policy-making 
practices and organisational structures). 
I believe this type of assessment should be made 
more systematic – again, by developing indicators 
of additionality tailored to the specificities of each 
programme.
5. Conclusion
Is ‘added value’ a workable criterion with which 
to evaluate programmes, build consensus on 
new priorities and guide the re-allocation of 
EU funding? My answer is yes, but under two 
conditions. First, added value is particularly useful 
if applied at the micro level (to assess the output 
and outcomes of existing EU programmes) rather 
than at the macro level (to build consensus on new 
16  ESF Expert Evaluation Network Final synthesis report: 
Main ESF achievements, 2007-2013, March 2014.
EU priorities and guide the re-allocation of EU 
resources across policy areas). Added value at the 
macro-level constitutes a nice academic exercise, 
but has little or no impact on big decisions about 
EU spending allocations. By contrast, at the micro 
level additionality can be helpful to identify design 
failures and implementation gaps, and can provide 
inputs for programmes to be improved. To this 
end, however, it is important to develop tailor-
made indicators of additionality, and to apply 
them more systematically in ex-post assessments.
Second, whether they are applied at the macro or 
at the micro level, we have to accept the inherent 
methodological limitations of any type of added 
value assessment. There is no sense in trying to 
convert them into rigorous quantitative tests to 
check EU spending. Not only are the difficulties 
in estimating counter-factuals important, but 
additionality can result from different factors 
(benefits from scale, cross-country externalities, 
coordination gains, complementarities, the 
capacity to conduct long-term goals), and some 
of them can only be apprehended through 
qualitative methods. Added value assessments 
cannot substitute political decisions on spending; 
they can only serve to better inform these political 
decisions. 
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Initial situation and 
challenges in Saxony after 
reunification
With German reunification on 3 October 1990, 
the Free State of Saxony was reconstituted as one 
of the five new Länder which arose from the GDR. 
Back then, the situation was very challenging. 
As in the other new Länder, the economy had 
nearly collapsed. Machinery and production 
methods were obsolete and many products were 
not competitive in terms of cost and performance. 
Most of the infrastructure, like streets and 
highways, airports, bridges and buildings, was 
tattered, rather primitive and highly insufficient. 
As a result, productivity was very low. In 1991 
the Saxon gross national product (GNP) per 
capita equalled only about a third of that of West 
Germany, which was 22,000 EUR back then. With 
the economic breakdown, the collapse of many 
establishments and the structural change, the 
labour market was also hit very hard. For more than 
a decade, the numbers of unemployed increased 
almost steadily, resulting in an unemployment 
rate as high as 18 per cent in 2005. In addition to 
these social and economic problems, the record 
of the former GDR’s environmental situation was 
also altogether alarming. 
For the successful reconstruction and 
establishment of a sound economy in Saxony, 
many ambitious challenges needed to be tackled. 
There was a need for modern and enlarged 
infrastructure. Productivity-enhancing machinery 
and procedures had to be introduced in businesses. 
It was necessary to promote a structural change in 
industry to end up with more competitive firms. 
In order to reduce and prevent unemployment 
and to enlarge the human resources of firms which 
needed to be fully equipped for the new economic 
environment, education and training measures 
had to be taken on a large scale. Firms also 
needed support for research and the development 
of successful products capable of surviving in 
increasingly globalized markets. Last but not least, 
repair of environmental damage was necessary to 
reduce environment-related health disorders and 
to create a recreational environment.
The structure of European 
funding in Saxony from 1991 
to 2020
Successful accomplishment of these objectives was 
essentially supported by European funding. It has 
represented a significant share of the many public 
investments which have been made in Saxony 
during the last 25 years. Saxony has invested in 
a wide range of fields for which different funds 
have been used, like the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social 
Fund (ESF) and the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). Figure 
1 shows EU funding for Saxony over the period 
1991-2020. The total budget provided by the EU 
was about 14.1  bn euros in the period 1991-13. 
For the current period 2014-2020, a further 3.6 bn 
euros are being provided.
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According to reporting and accounting, Saxony 
was able to almost completely spend the funds 
provided and use them appropriately in the 
periods from 1991 to 2013. 
Among all the European funds, Saxony has 
received the most support from the ERDF. In 
the  2007-13 period alone, more than 43,000 
projects in the fields of science and research, 
education, economic development, traffic and 
flood prevention were supported. The primary 
goal of this Operational Programme has been 
sustainable development through an improvement 
in the prerequisites for environmentally friendly 
economic and employment growth. There were 
a total of six priority axes. With about one third 
of the total amount, the most subsidies were 
scheduled for ‘strengthening innovation, science 
and research.’ Single-company and R&D projects 
were supported to improve the knowledge base, 
and technology transfer, risk capital provision for 
new technology companies and the application 
of e-services in enterprises and administration 
were also targets in this axis. Almost a fifth of 
the funds were budgeted for each of ‘enhancing 
the competitiveness of manufacturing industry,’ 
‘improving the transport infrastructure’ and 
‘expansion and improvement of the infrastructure 
to permit durable economic growth.’ In these 
fields, not only were enterprise investment and 
business-oriented infrastructure funded but also 
environment-related projects like rehabilitating 
former mining areas, revitalising former industrial 
sites and conversion zones and investing in 
environmental protection, renewable forms of 
energy and flood protection. However, the level 
of education of the workforce also plays a decisive 
role in the development and competitiveness of 
the Saxon economy. Therefore, funds from the 
priority area ‘improvements in education and 
training infrastructure’ were devoted to enhancing 
Figure 1. European funding 1991-2020 for  Saxony
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the quality and effectiveness of schooling and 
vocational training systems. Finally, funds 
were allocated for ‘technical assistance’ in the 
implementation of the Operational Programme. In 
all these axes, the ERDF funds were supplemented 
by public and private national money. The funds 
were invested to support regional development 
and they contributed to the creation of new jobs.
Education and employment are the keywords 
for the application of the contributions Saxony 
received from the ESF, the second largest source 
of financial support from the European structural 
funds. In the 2007-13 period, EU funds and 
national money were used, among other things, 
to support vocational qualifications, vocational 
training and vocational orientation, and also to 
foster an entrepreneurial spirit, better access to 
employment, social integration and the acquisition 
of intercultural competences. In total, about 
50,000 projects were able to be supported in this 
period, with more than 500,000 participants in 
different life situations – students and persons in 
further training or looking for an apprenticeship, 
unemployed and disadvantaged persons, but also 
entrepreneurs in search of advice or coaching. 
Important priorities were to support the adaptation 
of employees and enterprises to new requirements, 
to arrange sustainable education, training and 
research and to encourage more people into the 
workforce. These aims were accompanied by the 
challenge of coping with the demographic change 
of a declining and aging population and with a 
changing economic environment. Fostering equal 
chances for women and men and ecological, 
economic and social sustainability were additional 
important objectives tackled with the help of the 
ESF.
Finally, the EAFRD supports the sustainable 
development of rural areas, in addition to the 
Common Agricultural Policy. There were four focal 
points in the 2007-13 period. First, restructuring, 
development and innovation aimed at helping to 
improve the competitiveness of agriculture and 
forestry. Second, the environment and landscape 
were to be improved with the promotion of 
cultivation. Third, life quality in rural areas was to 
be increased and a diversified economy promoted. 
The fourth and comprehensive aim was continued 
support for the LEADER concept. 
However, EU funds have not only been used 
for national projects. More than 700m euros of 
EU funding have been invested in cross-border 
projects since 1994 to develop the border region 
of Saxony, the Czech Republic and Poland.
Some examples of EU  
co-funded projects in Saxony 
Our vision is for the Free State of Saxony to become 
among the leading scientific and economic 
regions in Europe. To achieve this target, one of 
the core strategies is to use EU structural funds for 
technology subsidies. In particular, the ERDF is 
being used to support research and development 
(R & D) projects which otherwise would not be 
realised. The co-funding contributes to a stronger 
Saxon economy and assists its often small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME) to develop and 
improve competitive products and services. 
One of the most famous Saxon success stories 
has been the establishment of an information 
and communication technology (ICT) cluster, 
also known as ‘Silicon Saxony.’ Silicon Saxony, 
which has also benefited substantially from 
funding from the ERDF and the ESF, is Europe’s 
largest microelectronics site. This region in the 
triangle between the cities of Dresden, Freiberg 
and Chemnitz is one of the most innovative ICT 
clusters in the world. Dresden represents the core 
of Silicon Saxony and has a variety of institutions 
doing cutting-edge research in the field of 
microelectronics.
Another important use of funds from the European 
Union is support for the education infrastructure, 
in particular for vocational training. The dual 
system of vocational training in Germany is 
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recognized worldwide and has been highlighted 
by the OECD because of its close connection 
between the education system and the labour 
market. Saxony strengthens this dual vocational 
training with funding from the ESF and ERDF. For 
example, ERDF funding has been used to promote 
the development of the numerous vocational 
training centres in Saxony. In total, 248 projects in 
the field of vocational training have been funded 
by the ERDF and more than 350,000 students have 
successfully graduated from these schools.
With the successful modernization and 
enlargement of the education infrastructure 
nearly complete, in the current 2014-20 period 
the investment priority has changed to improving 
the climate efficiency of school buildings. This not 
only helps reduce operating costs but also makes 
a substantial contribution to reducing emissions 
of carbon dioxide and therefore promotes the 
climate targets of the European Union.
Status quo and foresight
The successful development of the Saxon economy 
is mirrored by its productivity catch-up with West 
Germany. GNP per capita was only about a third of 
that of West Germany directly after reunification 
but this measure has now doubled. In 2013, goods 
and services amounting to about 24,200 euros 
per inhabitant were produced in Saxony. This is 
equivalent to a productivity level at about 91 per 
cent of the EU 27 average. Consistent with the 
development of income, the unemployment rate 
also dropped to about 8 per cent in 2015.
Also thanks to the generous support from the 
EU structural funds, Saxony has had enormous 
success with convergence. However, much effort 
still needs to be made before harmonization of 
average income levels is completed. Therefore, in 
the current 2014-2020 period the money provided 
must still be used most effectively. In accordance 
with the successful convergence process, Saxony 
is no longer classified as an area eligible for the 
highest possible support. In line with intra-
regional differences in productivity convergence, 
the allocation is split between areas with higher 
claims and phasing-out more developed areas.
As shown in Figure 2, six priority axes are defined 
for ERDF spending. Most of the funds are 
devoted to “strengthening research, technology 
development and innovation.” In particular, the 
competitiveness of applied research institutes 
and research, development and innovation by 
enterprises in Saxony is to be improved in this 
area. A second priority is “strengthening the 
competitiveness of SMEs.” The importance of this 
is highlighted by the fact that one of the main 
drawbacks of the Saxon economy is its lack of 
large companies and headquarters, resulting in a 
productivity gap which is hard to close. Hence, it 
is very important to encourage SMEs to grow and 
improve their productivity and competitiveness, 
for example by product and process innovation, 
increasing their presence in international markets, 
market access and broadband networks. Another 
part of the budget is scheduled for the “support 
of a decrease in CO2 emissions.” This targets the 
private economy, public buildings, infrastructure 
and the traffic sector. The “risk prevention” 
priority axis aims at flood protection, higher levels 
of protection from the consequences of former 
mining activity and a reduction of risks in heavily 
polluted areas. Some funding is also planned 
to “support sustainable urban development” by 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions, improving 
cultural and tourism offers, utilizing waste land 
and reducing emigration from disadvantaged city 
quarters by empowering them as economic and 
social areas. The remaining financial means are to 
be spent on “technical assistance.” To improve the 
quality of the Operational Programme, to check 
the environmental effects of the schedule and 
the efficiency of the financial instruments in the 
programme, a number of ex ante evaluations were 
conducted prior to drawing up the Operational 
Programme. 
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Figure 2. Priority axes ERDF 2014-20
Figure 3 shows the core elements in the ESF use 
in the current period: support for education, 
vocational training, sustainable and high-quality 
employment, social inclusion and the fight against 
poverty and discrimination. An important part 
of the funding is scheduled in the priority axis of 
“sustainable and high-quality employment and 
support for employee mobility.” Particular sub-
goals in this area are encouragement of start-
ups and an entrepreneurial spirit, stimulation 
of cooperation between academic research 
and the private economy, strengthening of the 
innovation capabilities of enterprises, support 
for the availability and development of qualified 
employees and improvement of the work-life 
balance and social responsibility. A number of 
specific goals are also summarized in the priority 
axis of “supporting social inclusion and fighting 
poverty and any kind of discrimination.” For 
example, the money is to be used to improve the 
labour market opportunities of unemployed and 
long-term unemployed persons by providing 
them with qualifications and strengthening their 
employment abilities. Another goal is social 
inclusion and integration in employment for 
people in socially disadvantaged city quarters. 
Functional illiterates are to be supported, as are 
ex-prisoners who need assistance with social 
integration and integration in the labour market. 
Most of the money is devoted to “investments in 
education and vocational training for competences 
and lifelong learning.” The full individual 
educational potential of disadvantaged children 
and teenagers is to be tapped and the vocational 
orientation of young persons improved. Other 
goals in this area are a strengthening of the dual 
vocational training system and an increase in the 
number and qualifications of academic employees. 
The remaining part of the ESF funding is again 
scheduled for “technical assistance.” 
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Figure 3. Priority axes ESF 2014-20
Saxony borders on Poland and the Czech Republic. 
It is therefore very well suited to cross-border 
projects. There is a cooperation programme 
to enable the funding and implementation of 
cross-border cooperation projects in the Saxon-
Czech border region. This is divided into four 
priority axes. The first supports projects aiming 
at adaptation to climate change, risk prevention 
and risk management. A particular focus is on 
investments to cope with special risks, to ensure 
disaster control and to develop emergency 
management systems. The second priority is the 
preservation and protection of the environment 
and support for resource efficiency. In this area, 
investments in water supply and distribution, 
in the preservation, protection, support and 
development of the natural and cultural heritage 
and in deepening cross-border coordination 
to preserve and support biological diversity 
are subsidized. The third priority axis supports 
investments in education, vocational training 
and lifelong learning and the development and 
implementation of joint programmes for general 
and vocational education and vocational training. 
Priority axis four funds enhancement of the 
institutional capacities of public authorities, 
stakeholders and efficient public administration 
by supporting cooperation in matters of law and 
administration and cooperation between citizens 
and institutions. Funding comes from the ERDF 
and is granted for suitable projects with German 
and Czech partners which plan and implement 
the project together. A current programme in 
which Saxony cooperates with Poland has similar 
priorities. 
With the efforts made by the people in Saxony and 
support from strong partners like the European 
Union, we are well on the way to completing the 
convergence process which started about 25 years 
ago. The successes so far are reasons for pride and 
gratitude. We are highly motivated to use any 
future funding from European structural funds 
in the most promising and appropriate ways to 
strengthen Saxony’s potential, the productivity of 
its economy and the prosperity of its people – as 
part of a strong and successful European Union. 
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Introduction
The budget of the European Union (EU) is small 
yet controversial. For the period 2007-13, over 
seven full years payments amounted to €821 
billion (in 2004 prices), which is equivalent to 
1 per cent of the collective national wealth or 
gross national income (GNI) of the EU’s then 
27 member states. For the period 2014-2020, 
payments amount to €908 billion (in 2011 prices) 
or 0.95 per cent of GNI. To put these amounts in 
perspective, the average level of public spending 
by European governments is equivalent to 45 per 
cent of gross domestic product (GDP), and more 
during a recession. 
The spending for 2014-2020 is subdivided as 
follows. 34 per cent goes to cohesion policy, 29 per 
cent goes on direct payments for agriculture and 
fisheries, 10 per cent covers rural development 
and environmental spending, and 13 per cent 
is allocated to ‘competitiveness for growth 
and jobs,’ which includes innovation, research 
and development (R&D) and transport. The 
remaining headings are ‘Global Europe’ (foreign 
policy), which accounts for 6 per cent of spending, 
administration, which is a further 6 per cent, and 
‘Security and citizenship,’ which accounts for 2 per 
cent.
Calls for change in the budget are popularly 
centred around percentages and amounts, 
although targeting and use of leverage for added 
value have entered the discourse. Sometimes the 
focus is more on indirect policy objectives, such as 
achieving economic innovation (a public good), 
which may depend on how money is spent rather 
than actual amounts, although calls for reforms 
or reductions in the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) are common. Given the complicated 
structure and rules of the EU budget, this chapter 
evaluates the failed reforms of 2013 and looks to 
possible changes in the EU’s budget in 2017 or 
2020.
The EU’s annual budget is passed within the 
limits set in the multiannual financial framework 
(MFF), which is agreed for a period of seven 
years, currently 2014-2020. The MFF is agreed 
unanimously by the member states and the 
European Parliament (EP). Amending the MFF 
requires unanimity, and this is part of the reason 
why the EU budget changes little in most of the 
negotiating rounds. 
Since the establishment of the European Social 
Fund (ESF) in 1958 and the CAP in 1962, the EU 
has expanded the budget to meet certain ends. 
Member states had always accepted this expansion 
for reasons that include cost effectiveness and the 
guarantee of more efficient economic integration. 
For example, running a single agricultural policy 
may cost less and be more efficient than 28 different 
agricultural policies at the national level. It also 
compensates a sector that may otherwise oppose 
European integration. However, there are many 
distortions. In the case of agriculture, for example, 
dairy farming benefits more in one member state 
than in its neighbour.17 With regard to cohesion, 
effective redistribution is conditioned from one 
member state to another by the availability of co-
financing. 
The EU’s enlargements to central and eastern 
Europe in 2004-13 and the global economic 
and eurozone crises have created demand for 
continued redistribution and investment in public 
goods to support economic innovation. On the 
other hand, there are counter-demands from 
17  I am grateful to Jorge Núñez Ferrer for this observation.
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some member states for the practice of national 
austerity to be applied at the European level. The 
Lisbon Treaty, vaunted as a simplification of the 
EU, has reinforced the power to block agreement 
on fundamental change in the budget (Benedetto 
2013). 
The negotiations for the period after 2013, 
which resulted in stalemate, had unique features, 
notably the effects of the global economic crisis 
since 2008 and contradictory desires. There were 
those who wanted Europe to deliver a stimulus 
for economic growth both through subsidies 
and the provision of public goods and those who 
desired domestic and EU-level austerity by fixing 
the EU budget at below 1 per cent of GNI while 
protecting agricultural expenditure. These issues 
and the need to respond to the ongoing questions 
of eurozone governance, perhaps via an eventual 
eurozone budget and a eurozone treasury, remain 
on the agenda.
The question is how to make the EU’s budget 
more efficient and legitimate. In what follows, I 
summarise some of the literature on reforming 
the budget. Then, I analyse some of the previous 
budget changes negotiated in the context of the 
MFF and the financial perspectives. I propose 
further reforms based on efficiency and legitimacy 
which target public goods, redistribution, co-
financing, the system of rebates/corrections, and 
reform of the own resources (or revenue base) of 
the EU. Finally, I assess some of the consequences 
of the possible reforms.
Thinking on Budgetary Reform
The division of spending appears difficult to shift. 
In the 2014-2020 MFF, 63 per cent of spending 
is direct redistribution – almost equally divided 
between cohesion on the one hand and CAP 
and fisheries on the other. Some net contributors 
benefit significantly from this redistribution, 
which is Europe-wide rather than being 
targeted at the poorest. The EU adopts policy 
commitments to support economic innovation 
and new technologies, yet directs comparatively 
little funding to these ends. The paradox of the EU 
budget is that it is both too much and too little. 
Too much is directed at redistribution and too 
little is invested in public goods that can provide a 
collective benefit for the European economy. 
The Lisbon Agenda of 2000 could have been a 
major focal point for changing the EU budget to 
direct it to more efficient ends than traditional 
redistribution. The Agenda’s ambitions of 
establishing the EU as the world’s most innovative 
area for technology and the new economy by the 
year 2010 were dashed. Demands were renewed 
in the form of the ‘Europe 2020’ programme 
and Jean-Claude Juncker’s European Fund for 
Strategic Investment (EFSI), which is supported 
by public goods spending. The objective of the 
EFSI is to provide leverage for investment in 
economic growth with public funds underwriting 
investment by the private sector. Public goods are 
defined as expenditure where there is a collective 
benefit that is not about redistribution, which 
would therefore exclude the CAP and most of the 
cohesion policy. There is no accepted definition 
of public goods investment, but it usually 
includes investment in R&D and would include 
infrastructure investments in the Energy Union, 
whose aim is collective energy security, or the 
digital single market.
According to Schild (2008), the odds on shifting the 
financial priorities in the consensus (and multiple 
veto) system of the EU are low. Institutional 
rules that encourage entrenchment are therefore 
part of the problem, besides the more obvious 
weight of veto players, who can block any change. 
Important package deals in the past – for example 
the creation of the own resources in 1970 and 
the doubling of the ERDF in 1988, the creation 
of financial perspectives and the GNI percentage 
own resource – have been reached when the cost of 
the status quo exceeded the costs of change for all 
parties. Such costs may be political or policy-based 
rather than purely financial. For Schild (2008), 
the roles of the Commission, Council and EP, the 
political context and the sequence of decision-
making account for the fact that budgetary reform 
happened more radically and more rapidly in 
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the few years immediately following 1988 than 
was ever the case after the mid-1990s. The Single 
European Act was ratified in 1987 and it was to 
establish an internal market by 1993. The need 
to finance the creation of that market was part 
of the pro-reform context in 1988 in a way that 
may not apply to the post-enlargement EU of the 
global financial and eurozone crises. However, the 
effects of the migration crisis since 2014 and of the 
UK’s impending departure from the EU require 
rapid responses that may depend on reform to the 
budget and own resources.
The principle of fiscal federalism is that states 
in a federation retain control of most of their 
tax receipts and contribute revenue to a federal 
authority whose expenditure provides collective 
gains on a more cost-effective basis than would 
be the case at the state level. For Heinemann et al. 
(2010) and Osterloh et al. (2009), the EU budget 
does not conform to these norms. Redistribution 
occurs, but there is little provision of public goods 
that enhance economic growth. Public goods 
are blocked by a common pool problem, since 
spending maximums, or ceilings, imposed by 
the rules on own resources and the MFF, create 
incentives for over-spending on redistribution 
and under-spending on public goods. Osterloh 
et al (2009) argue that it is necessary to find 
a solution to this which would also take into 
account the British ‘correction’ or rebate, replacing 
it with a generalised correction mechanism. The 
threat of national veto has prevented its abolition 
in more recent times. Successful initiatives whose 
principles could be extended include the EFSI and 
its provision of leverage to encourage economic 
growth. The High Level Group on Own Resources, 
appointed in 2013 under the chairmanship 
of Mario Monti, investigated new sources of 
revenue for the EU budget in order to reduce GNI 
percentage transfers. This should permit an escape 
from the discourse of juste retour, which will be 
an easier task if the UK leaves the EU following its 
referendum. 
What is holding back reform? Mayhew (2009) 
identifies the problem of multiple veto players 
and an impenetrably complicated system of own 
resources and refunds as hindering progress. While 
the call for expanding the EU’s commitments to 
spending on public goods is laudable, public goods 
spending is treated just like redistribution when 
member state governments calculate their net 
positions for their domestic audiences. And yet 
the case for public goods is compelling, whether 
it is to finance R&D, digital or energy networks, 
or the training of frontier police on the EU’s 
common external land border to the east or its 
maritime border to the south, all of which provide 
collective benefits. In any bottom-up approach to 
public goods, policy-based spending fails because 
recipients of agricultural or regional development 
funds fear that they will have to finance any 
increase in public goods spending through cuts 
in redistribution. This problem has become acute 
since the absorption capacity of these recipients 
has been called into question. A reluctance among 
the contributors to fund absorption incapacity 
and a reluctance to accept cuts in distribution 
among its recipients leads the net contributors to 
impose inflexible ceilings on expenditure so that 
additional funds for public goods are impossible. 
For those who are sceptical of EU spending, a 
disadvantage is that the low and inflexible ceilings 
actually create an incentive to spend within a cut-
off period that is annual or based on the seven-
year MFF, whereas allowing unspent amounts to 
roll over may encourage lower and better spending 
overall.
There are several suggestions in the literature 
on how to break through this (De la Fuente and 
Doménech 2001; Rant and Mrak 2010). There is a 
need to aim either at the concept of net balances 
– which does not count the benefits of market 
integration for wealthier net contributors – or for 
a reform of redistribution in order to eliminate the 
political need for rebates or ‘corrections.’
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However, not all spending that results in 
simplistic net balances is the same. Heading 5 
is the administrative budget of the EU, whose 
economic effects differ from those of Heading 
1a (Competitiveness), which finances public 
goods like R&D, or Heading 2, which includes 
agriculture. There is also the effect of funds outside 
the EU budget but which are still EU spending, like 
the EFSI, the European Development Fund (EDF) 
and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). To 
take the case of Heading 1a and medical research, 
monies disbursed to a successful contractor count 
as a grant to the member state of the consortium 
leader, yet the direct financial benefit may be 
shared among partners and subcontractors in 
many member states. If the research is successful, 
patients and the pharmaceutical sector will benefit 
regardless of location, as will subcontractors. 
Saving lives also saves money if active tax payers 
survive. A true net balance is therefore impossible 
to calculate, and it becomes even more difficult 
if the economic effects of funds outside the EU 
budget, like EFSI, are added to the mix.
If new own resources are agreed that provide the 
EU budget with significant financing outside the 
GNI percentage transfers, a limited rebate system 
could still be considered, not on a net balance but 
on a gross contribution. If the value of a member 
state’s gross contribution exceeds the equivalent 
of a notional figure such as 1 per cent of its GNI, 
then a rebate could be permitted, although this 
may seem to defeat the point of moving away 
from GNI-based own resources. This might 
overcome the objections of member states that 
would otherwise block change to the GNI-based 
own resource for fear that they would lose out 
financially – for example, those member states 
with carbon-intensive economies in the event of 
an own resource based on carbon consumption. 
The new rebates, rather than being unconditional 
as they are at present, could be tied to expenditure 
by the recipient member state on EU policy 
priorities including cohesion, so that the steering 
effect of any new resource, such as reducing carbon 
consumption, would not be affected.
The CAP could be part-financed by member states, 
thus reducing incentives for its perpetuation 
(Heinemann et al 2010), although this would 
produce a veto danger. Traditional rebates may 
have to survive if the legitimacy of certain types of 
expenditure, such as on agriculture, is not wholly 
accepted. 
An alternative solution is to embrace the mantra of 
pre-defined net positions (Heinemann et al 2010). 
The status of a member state as a net contributor 
or recipient would be publicly recognised and 
made clear in the management of revenue and 
spending. Significant net contributors could then 
be compensated for ‘over-contributing’ in a more 
transparent way than happens under the system 
agreed between 2007 and 2013 and after 2014. 
Borrowing a proposal from De la Fuente and 
Doménech (2001), Heinemann et al (2010) suggest 
that member states should agree on the total level 
of redistribution and that net balances should be 
inversely correlated with income levels, so that 
poorer member states contribute less and receive 
more. Spending programmes would take effect 
without looking at contribution levels, following 
which a correction mechanism would ensure that 
the agreed distributions between member states 
are accurate. Spending on public goods (Headings 
1a and 3) and spending on explicit redistribution 
through the structural funds (most of Heading 
1b) could be excluded from the calculation of the 
correction mechanism, as is already the case for 
Heading 4 (Global Europe).
Heinemann et al (2010) argue that many supposedly 
logical strategies for reforming the budget fail to 
consider the constraints that preserve the status 
quo. Embracing pre-defined net balances and 
attempting a reform that encompasses revenue, 
spending and the fixation with net balances could 
be more efficient in terms of outcome, while at the 
same time making the provision of public goods 
more attractive.
While the proposals by Heinemann et al (2010) 
appear the most compelling, no definite solution 
to overcoming the veto of a single member state 
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that anticipates a loss is proposed. It remains to be 
seen if the departure of the UK from the EU will 
weaken net balance demands and make it easier to 
achieve reform without rebates. Failure to agree on 
a new MFF because of a veto by a single member 
state automatically results in continuation of 
the amounts pertaining to the final year of the 
previous package. If the status quo is preferred by 
just one member state over any of the alternative 
options, reform can be blocked. 
Previous Experience of 
Budgetary Agreements 
This section compares previous budget packages 
and the 2013 agreement. The final section of the 
paper draws on this evidence to ask what type of 
reform may be possible.
As explained above, few of the past budget deals 
secured real policy shifts, notably only those of 
1970 and 1988. Following the entry into force 
of the Single European Act in 1987, an inter-
institutional agreement between the Commission, 
Council and EP was reached in 1988 which opened 
the way for a ‘Delors’ budget to replace the CAP-
oriented, intergovernmental ‘de Gaulle’ budget of 
the past (Laffan and Lindner 2010; Linder 2006). 
This allowed for a doubling of the ERDF to hasten 
economic development in less prosperous regions 
and to facilitate the integration of the European 
internal market. This budget change of 1988 
had major significance and matched the EU’s 
development in other spheres, notably the internal 
market. The global financial and eurozone crises 
after 2008 provided a plausible launch pad for 
major changes to the budget, but these did not 
come to fruition. The post-2014 migration crisis 
and the departure of the UK from the EU may 
provide a real reform impetus. Otherwise, the 
political and economic costs of budget conflict 
will exceed those of continuity.
Table 1. Spending across MFFs 2007-2020 and the Commission proposal for 2014-2020
FP/MFF 2007-13  2007-2013















































1a. Competitiveness for growth 
and employment
74,098 8.57 154,888 15.11 125,614 13.08
1b. Cohesion for growth and 
employment
308,041 35.64 336,020 32.78 325,149 33.87
2. Preservation and manage-
ment of natural resources
371,344 42.96 382,927 37.36 373,179 38.87
of which, market-related ex-
penditure and direct payments 
(CAP)
293,105 33.91 281,825 27.50 277,851 28.94
3. Citizenship, freedom, secu-
rity, justice
10,770 1.25 18,535 1.81 15,686 1.63
4. EU as a global player 49,463 5.72 70,000 6.83 58,704 6.12
5. Administration 49,800 5.76 62,629 6.11 61,629 6.42
             
Total Commitments 864,316   1,025,000 959,988
Percentage of GNI 1.048   1.05 1.00
Total Payments 820,780   972,198 908,400
Percentage of GNI 1.00   1.00 0.95
Source: Official Journal of the European Union.
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The multiannual budget package for 2007-2013 
was initially agreed in December 2005. It set the 
level of commitments at 1.045 per cent – a real 
reduction compared to the commitment level of 
1.08 per cent of GNI in 1999. However, following 
the enlargement of 2004 the EU had grown by 
ten new member states, so the total GNI had 
increased alongside a fall in GDP per capita. In 
January 2006, the EP rejected the agreement on 
the grounds that it opposed budget cuts and what 
it saw as insufficient resources being oriented 
towards public goods like R&D. The Council 
agreed to a small rise to 1.048 per cent of GNI in 
commitments.
The effect of the negotiations over the package for 
2007-13 was that the Commission proposed an 
overall increase in spending, with big cuts in the 
CAP, smaller cuts in cohesion and a big increase in 
public goods. The end result in 2006 was an overall 
cut rather than an increase, with notable cuts in 
the CAP, although not as radical as those that the 
Commission proposed, a freeze for cohesion and 
a moderate increase in public goods.
With the publication of the results of the European 
Commission’s review of the budget (European 
Commission 2010), the EP set to work on drafting 
its own priorities for the 2014-20 MFF. The EP 
supported a new growth strategy for Europe 2020 
(public goods) and the notion of the EU providing 
added value, for which budgetary increases 
would be necessary. It also noted the new EU 
responsibilities under the Lisbon Treaty in foreign 
policy, climate change, energy, tourism and civil 
protection – public goods all of which would 
require budgetary increases. In 2006 it had been 
possible to improve funding to these areas while 
cutting the overall budget due to larger cuts in the 
CAP. 
The EP called for more flexibility within and 
between headings in the budget so as to utilise 
under-spent resources, and it called for binding 
reviews of the MFF and the ability to raise its 
spending ceiling. It condemned the 1 per cent of 
GNI ceiling for payments, considering that it was 
too low for proper investment in public goods. 
Finally, the EP (2011) called for a new Convention 
among the EP, national parliaments, the European 
Commission and national governments to draft a 
new budgetary agreement. 
As Table 1 shows, in June 2011 the Commission 
proposed freezing spending and setting payments 
at 1.00 per cent and commitments at 1.05 per cent 
of GNI – or €1,025 billion in 2011 prices – for 
seven years. Heading 1a, which includes science, 
research, innovation, nuclear safety, education, 
energy and transport, increased from a 9 to 15 
per cent share in the Commission’s proposals 
although the eventual agreement for 2014-2020 
brought this down to 13 per cent. Heading 1b – 
cohesion – decreased slightly from around 36 to 
33 per cent in the Commission’s proposal, with 
the final agreement reaching 34 per cent. The part 
of Heading 2 which includes rural development 
and environment remained almost frozen at 10 
per cent. The biggest hit was again taken by direct 
payments under the CAP and for fisheries, which 
were to fall from 34 to 27.5 per cent of the budget, 
although the final agreement for 2014-2020 fixed 
this at a 29 per cent share.
What we saw in 2005-6 and in 2013 were small 
reductions in spending overall, targeted at 
agriculture and cohesion, with modest increases for 
public goods, which in the case of infrastructure, 
education and R&D still amounted to no more 
than 13 per cent of commitments.
Given the modest reforms agreed in 2013, the 
following section will discuss what type of future 
reform may be possible, given the report by the 
High Level Group on Own Resources and the 
2016 review of the MFF.
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Future reform
This section concludes by speculating on the 
way forward for the budget after the 2016 review 
and the new MFF after 2020. The Lisbon Treaty 
and past practice make exit from the status quo 
difficult to imagine, given the ease of veto or veto 
threat. For example, net contributor member 
states with strong R&D sectors may nevertheless 
oppose a policy that moves funds from the CAP 
to public goods if they are influenced by a well-
organised domestic agricultural lobby. A number 
of factors may be relevant in helping to secure 
a reform. Charles Blankart and Gerrit Koester 
(2012) have proposed escaping from the current 
constraints on the budget not by making cuts in 
redistribution but by creating a supplementary 
budget to support public goods by means of 
enhanced cooperation. The wider literature (c.f. 
De la Fuente and Doménech 2001; Heinemann et 
al 2010; Osterloh et al 2009; Rant and Mrak 2010; 
Schild 2008) proposes other exit strategies. While 
these may seem improbable – not least because of 
underestimation of veto use by any member state 
that is uncertain about the outcomes of change – 
the effects of the financial crises since 2008, the 
refugee crisis since 2014 and the almost certain 
British exit from the EU have been unprecedented. 
One solution to the crisis of the eurozone is further 
economic integration, with a budget increase 
sufficient to allow intervention in the case of 
asymmetric shocks. As the literature recognises, 
very little funding for public goods or economic 
intervention can be harvested from reductions in 
redistribution due to member state veto power. 
Only an increased budget – whose revenue may be 
direct or indirect – that can deliver that investment 
through expansion of leverage programmes such 
as EFSI may have some effect.
It is perhaps best to limit ourselves to asking about 
efficiency in the existing budget that is worth only 
1 per cent of GNI. As we know, a single member 
state can prevent agreement on a new MFF and 
ensure the rolling over of spending commitments 
from the final year of the previous agreement. 
There is therefore a strong bias towards continuity.
As Milio (2012) has suggested, discussion of actual 
amounts of money can be beside the point. The 
way in which funds are distributed (rather than 
the amounts) can make all the difference in terms 
of effect and perception. With respect to the CAP 
and cohesion, Greer (2012) and Milio (2012) have 
suggested that a re-orientation of programmes in a 
public goods direction may have greater effect and 
may make them more palatable politically, much 
as co-financing of the CAP also would. In terms 
of cohesion, Milio’s recommendations concerned 
concentrating funds, co-financing, additionality 
and re-orientation in favour of social rather than 
infrastructure priorities. The role of co-financing 
and the criteria for the release of funds can have 
positive effects on the capacities and internal 
discipline of sectors in receipt of these funds. 
Regardless of how much money is forthcoming (or 
not) in the future, we should expect the discourse 
on public goods to be more prominent than in 
traditional EU redistribution. Since 2014, there 
has also been much discussion of the budget’s 
leverage potential if it is used not for co-financing 
but for underwriting, as is the case of the EFSI. As 
new institutions, the EFSI and the ESM provide 
significant financing and added value, but from 
outside the EU budget. 
Some political actors may want something more 
radical than a marginal increase in Heading 1a 
for public goods or the guarantees of the EFSI, 
while the eurozone crisis may demand further 
intervention with public funds for economic 
regeneration. Other actors may want to block 
such intervention or protect existing areas of 
spending like the CAP, which requires a veto 
from only one member state to be possible. In 
2006 and 2013 there were modest net shifts in 
favour of public goods, although smaller than 
the Commission originally proposed. A further 
net shift may occur but only at the expense of the 
CAP and cohesion policy. Public goods will not 
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receive new money through a larger budget of the 
type that could absorb asymmetric shocks, which 
is demanded by the EP. It seems that the only ways 
to achieve funds for priorities in research and 
innovation, competitiveness, modern transport 
and infrastructure, training, nuclear safety, 
energy security and combating climate change are 
through politically difficult cuts to the CAP and 
cohesion, for new own resources to allow escape 
from net balance calculations while having a 
popular steering effect on negative behaviours, for 
example with regard to climate change or reckless 
activity within the financial markets, or to follow 
the suggestion of Blankart and Koester (2012) for a 
supplementary or parallel budget for public goods 
from which only the contributors would benefit – 
or perhaps a combination of the three.
Reform Proposals
The agreement of 2013 delivered continuity, a 
5 per cent spending reduction, a small rise for 
public goods and a package that largely protected 
agriculture and cohesion. The few novelties 
included increased flexibility, a review of the MFF 
in 2016, and the appointment of a high-level group 
to recommend changes to own resources, all at the 
insistence of the EP. 
More money in the budget to respond to the 
needs of a changing Europe would be desirable 
but difficult to achieve. As mentioned earlier, 
funds outside the budget like the ESM, EFSI and, 
historically, the EDF have addressed some of these 
needs but the creation of new systems is opaque 
and unaccountable. Moreover, much can be 
achieved by re-organising the administration or 
methods of the budget so that the amounts can be 
less important than how the amounts are spent.
My suggestions beyond those of Heinemann et 
al (2010) on a generalised correction mechanism 
and those of Milio (2012) on additionality and co-
financing follow.
Clearly, added value that finances something 
which would not be there otherwise – rather than 
replacing national expenditure that should have 
been present in the first place – is important. 
Added value can have leverage effects promoting 
economic growth or innovation, particularly in 
R&D. One problem is that the term remains ill-
defined. It can only be effective in expenditure 
that is differentiated and for which co-financing 
is required. It is difficult to achieve added value 
in areas of traditional redistribution unless 
there is much accountability and enforcement 
on the ground, which generates new levels of 
administration – thus complicating rather than 
simplifying.
Co-financing has been successfully used under 
Headings 1a and 1b for decades and is at the heart 
of the system of commitments, payments and 
outstanding commitments (RAL), since payments 
only follow commitments when programmes 
have been co-financed and successfully delivered. 
Co-financing has the advantage of requiring real 
commitment and partnership from the recipient 
structure.
A significant area of the budget where co-financing 
is absent is the CAP, which is non-differentiated. 
Ending this non-differentiation and reducing the 
commitments by, for example, 25 per cent – the 
figure that could be provided by co-financing – 
would reduce expenditure under Heading 2 and 
would reduce the justification rebates. This pill 
could be sweetened for Member States that do 
well from the CAP by allowing them to ‘top-up’ 
their co-financing on a voluntary basis to provide 
more income for the agricultural sector. 100 from 
the EU budget would therefore become 75 plus 
25 from co-financing and a further 25 from a 
voluntary ‘top-up.’ While EU expenditure would 
fall to 75, farmers’ incomes could rise to 125. The 
consequence would be a weakening of the CAP 
as a common policy, its partial re-nationalisation, 
and the chance that agriculture in some Member 
States would benefit from an extra subsidy denied 
to others.
Concerning cohesion policy, Milio (2012) argues 
that too many resources have been allotted to 
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economic development and infrastructure. Such 
assets are often neglected after their construction 
but provide political benefits through their 
prestige. An area of policy that would deliver 
greater value is the social aspect of cohesion. 
Improved vocational and technical training in 
convergence regions could provide stronger bases 
for economic growth, including reduction of the 
brain drain, than the construction of an airport, 
for example.
Much of the literature has discussed the move away 
from redistribution and towards public goods (c.f. 
Heinemann et al 2010; Blankart and Koester 2012). 
The problem if this happens is indeed the fall in 
redistribution. This would be compounded by 
co-financing the CAP, which would result in less 
money being allocated to redistribution, not the 
least due to the potential non-affordability of local 
co-financing in poorer member states. Although 
all should benefit from greater investment in 
public goods, the funds under Heading 1a would 
be overwhelmingly distributed to wealthier 
Member States with innovative economic sectors. 
The MFF for 2014-2020 has lower spending than 
its predecessor but is governed by greater flexibility 
than in the past – an efficiency advance since the 
EU is better able to respond to unexpected events 
such as the 2015 refugee crisis. Nevertheless, the 
elimination of the old article 272.9 of the Lisbon 
Treaty means that increases in payments that go 
above the MFF ceilings now require unanimity 
(Benedetto 2013). 
Recognition that the de facto budget already 
significantly exceeds 1 per cent of GNI would be 
a step forward, given the costs of the ESM and 
EDP, of national government intervention in trust 
funds or the CFSP/CSDP, or when considering 
the leverage effects of the EFSI. It could allow for 
contemplation of a targeted budgetary expansion 
under the control of the EU institutions rather than 
through opaque intergovernmental processes.
Nevertheless, exasperation expressed to national 
governments in favour of expanding public goods 
or reforming the budget other than through 
cutting it rarely works. A permanent solution for 
the British and other corrections needs to be found 
if the UK remains a Member State. Reduction of 
CAP spending through co-financing provides a 
justification. More effective would be a proposal 
that temporarily increases the size of the British 
‘correction’ by replacing its permanent formula 
with a time-limited lump sum that is larger than 
the amount that the formula currently delivers. 
Together with the other lump sum corrections, 
the British one could then be phased out over the 
course of a decade. A further reason to convert 
the British correction into a lump sum is that its 
current formula base discourages UK authorities 
from seeking EU finance, since for every extra 
euro spent in the UK, its correction benefits 
fall, and this reduces the financial benefit of EU 
membership for British civil society.
If, however, national ‘corrections’ are to remain 
but in a reduced form, a generalised correction 
mechanism more ambitious than that proposed 
by Heinemann et al (2010) may be appropriate if it 
can also lead to greater public goods investment. 
This also avoids the risk that a parallel budget 
for public goods – as proposed by Blankart 
and Koester (2012) – financed only by the 
participating Member States would undermine 
the residual budget. While Heinemann et al 
(2010) propose separating public goods from 
redistribution, and eliminating public goods and 
some cohesion expenditure from the formula for 
corrections, I propose a straightforward reform. 
Competitiveness (Heading 1a), the cohesion 
fund, the convergence components of the ERDF 
and the ESF (in Heading 1b), the environment 
spending in Heading 2 and Heading 3 (Security 
and Citizenship) should follow Heading 4 (Global 
Europe) and be removed from any formulas 
for corrections. These are public goods that 
provide collective benefits or are income-based 
redistribution (in the case of Heading 1b). Only 
the proportion of contributions represented by 
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agriculture, fisheries and rural development in 
Heading 2 and structural funds consumed by 
prosperous regions in Heading 1b should be part 
of the correction formula. In due course, any 
correction based on funds that are locally co-
financed could gradually be withdrawn.
Possible consequences of the 
reform
Either in 2017 or after 2020, an unintended 
consequence of a reform based on relatively 
minor reductions in amounts spent on the CAP 
and cohesion policy, together with their internal 
re-organisation, is that they will disappoint 
and render the budget unable to meet Europe’s 
challenges for the future. How might this play out?
First of all, any further reduction in redistribution 
for agriculture or regions could trigger opposition 
from concentrated interests whose incomes will 
fall. Public opinion sympathetic to those interests 
could become more Eurosceptic, particularly in a 
context of continuing economic crisis. Second, it 
is not certain that reductions in cohesion spending 
for poor regions in wealthy member states will be 
offset by increased national subsidies for these 
regions. Third, a small increase in the budgets for 
competitiveness and other areas of public goods, 
financed through reductions in agricultural and 
cohesion spending, will not meet the EU’s need 
for regeneration. As Blankart and Koester (2012) 
suggest, there may be pressure for a parallel or 
supplementary budget to fill the gaps. Such a 
budget would be intergovernmental and detached 
from the EU itself, just like the current structures 
of the ESM. An unintended consequence then 
of significant new investment in public goods 
could be that, given an expansion in Europe-wide 
spending on innovation, there will be renewed 
pressure from net contributors for further cuts 
in the budget of the EU itself. Finally, any budget 
reform taking effect after 2017 is likely to conform 
with the tendency identified by Ackrill and Kay 
(2006) that old structures remain in place and are 
further complicated and rendered more opaque 
and confusing by new structures. The creation of 
a parallel or separate Eurozone budget would be a 
prime example of this.
It should be remembered that the European 
Council must agree unanimously on changes 
to the MFF. Given that budget reform is full 
of uncertainty and consequences that may be 
unintended, and that any one member state may 
make a credible threat of veto, there will be a 
strong bias towards continuity, since spending 
continuity is the consequence of non-agreement. 
One conclusion is that the prospects for significant 
budget reform are weak and that changes to 
the EU budget itself are likely to be no more 
significant than those agreed in 2006 and 2013. 
Change is most likely via the creation of parallel 
and intergovernmental funding streams, such as 
those that have already established the ESM, EFSI, 
and EDF, unless a historical package can be agreed 
which is less costly to all parties than the status 
quo.
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THE EU BUDGET AS 
AN ADDED VALUE:  
A COMMENT
by Michael Shackleton 
The debate about the EU budget reflects the 
argument about the European Union itself. The 
language of the budget community may be difficult 
for outsiders to grasp but the issues raised are not 
different from those that infuse all policy areas. 
The presentations on added value at the workshop 
offered a good opportunity to see where those 
issues stand, and in particular to see how they 
have evolved over the last twenty to thirty years. 
My own direct experience of the budget goes back 
more than 25 years and thus it was particularly 
interesting for me to try to evaluate how the 
debate on added value has evolved over that time. 
There was, in fact, a curious mix of continuity and 
change.
The most obvious change has been the overall size 
of the budget in relation to national budgets and 
the prevalent attitude towards its development. It is 
not simply that the idea of increasing the budget to 
develop Union policies has lost the hold that it had 
in the 1980s and early 1990s. No one now would 
dream of referring to the 1977 MacDougall report 
and its vision of a “small public sector federation” 
involving expenditure ranging between 5 and 10% 
of GDP. Quite the reverse has occurred: there 
has been a constant pressure to reduce the size 
of the budget, as illustrated in the discussions on 
the latest financial perspective. It is now a badge 
of honour, for example, for the UK government 
to claim that it succeeded in reducing the total 
amount of EU spending until 2020 (to 0.95% of 
gross national income), something that had never 
been achieved previously. As Kristalina Georgieva 
pointed out, this reduction has gone hand in 
hand with increasing demands on the budget, 
thereby pushing to the fore the need to look for 
added value: “we have to stretch every euro of our 
budget to the maximum, for the benefit of our 
people.” Moreover, she notes that the budget has 
traditionally been set at levels that were more than 
could be absorbed, making spending it a primary 
driver, rather than assessing its impact. No one 
would have spoken in these terms in the era of 
Delors. The important issue then was to develop 
new policies and to press for the maximum 
financial allocation. It would have been seen as 
odd indeed to have the group of Commissioners 
specifically tasked to look at a ‘Budget Focused on 
Results’ as we now have.
A second area of change is the structure of 
the budget. The balance between spending in 
different areas has developed over time but in an 
incremental fashion rather than as the result of 
a broader bargain about what the budget should 
finance and how. The commitment to create a 
Single European Market in the mid-1980s went 
hand in hand with a readiness to double the size 
of the structural funds. This linkage was broadly 
accepted by all and served to cement agreement on 
the first financial perspective. In the intervening 
years, it has proved much more difficult to get an 
agreement on the fundamental principles that 
should guide spending. Those who thought that 
the financial crisis of 2007-8 would encourage 
policymakers to consider using the EU budget to 
soften the impact on European societies have been 
disappointed. The balance between policy areas 
has certainly changed – the larger share of cohesion 
as compared with agriculture is an example – but 
attempts to alter the overall shape of the budget by 
clear policy choice have all foundered, and with 
them any agreed definition of what added value is. 
As Eulalia Rubio rightly points out, the term ‘added 
value’ is itself subject to very different definitions, 
thereby making it much more difficult to agree on 
what effectiveness and efficiency are perceived to 
be. There was no discussion of added value at all 
when the first financial perspective was discussed – 
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increased structural funding was seen as a valuable 
addition to the policy mix, a general good which 
did not require additional justification. The most 
common use of the term emerged in the context 
of the Maastricht debate and the promotion of 
the principle of subsidiarity, with the argument 
that increased spending needed to be justified in 
terms of the additional impact of spending at the 
European level beyond what could be achieved 
at the national level. However, the use of this 
definition of added value is fraught with difficulty. 
Rubio noted in her intervention that it assumes 
that there can be consensus on the different value 
of actions at the EU or the national level. What we 
are living with at the moment is a very much more 
marked level of disagreement about what the EU 
should do and how. This cannot be countered with 
the use of the arguments of fiscal federalism. No 
amount of technical definition of the impact of EU 
policies can overcome a basic political dissensus.
Rubio suggests that the most useful way of 
considering the idea of added value is to look at it 
in terms of the relationship between EU spending 
and behaviour at the national level, with the former 
being used to encourage changes in the latter. She 
points, for example, to the creation of ‘reform 
contracts’ to induce EMU countries to undertake 
necessary structural reforms or to the idea of 
using EU spending to sanction countries that do 
not apply decisions on the distribution of refugees. 
In this sense, EU spending would come to be seen 
more as a way of encouraging good behaviour. 
However, this should not be seen as an easy card 
to play: it immediately raises the question of the 
legitimacy of EU decisions and the readiness of 
national populations to accept the sanctions 
proposed. Will there be a readiness to accept a 
decision of the Commission or would member 
states appeal above it to the European Council 
to modify it? And how would the Commission 
hope to communicate such actions to civilian 
populations within which there is already a heavy 
dose of Euroscepticism? 
My own view is that the sanctioning of states is 
only possible in a framework which is much 
more political, much less technical in the way it 
operates. As Commissioner Georgieva points out, 
the activity of the present Commission has been 
structured around the ten priorities established 
by Juncker at the time he was seeking election as 
President by the European Parliament. Juncker had 
been chosen as the EPP candidate in advance of 
the 2014 European elections and his party’s ability 
to gain the most seats in the Parliament presented 
him with the chance to put forward a programme 
that could win majority support. The success of 
this strategy can be seen in the readiness of the 
Parliament majority to give its backing to him in 
the pursuit of his priorities. No one can claim that 
this automatically legitimizes the decisions of the 
Commission but it does give the institution a much 
more political mandate than it has had in the past. 
Without such a mandate it is hard to see how it 
could hope to induce member states to accept the 
kind of conditionality suggested by Rubio. 
As we heard from the Commissioner, the spending 
priorities of the Commission are specifically 
aligned with the ten areas that Juncker had said 
he wanted to stress back in July 2014. This marks a 
very different kind of way of structuring the budget 
and its relationship with the political direction 
of the EU. It also makes it easier to get support 
from Parliament and Council for measures such 
as the European Fund for Strategic Investment, a 
guarantee fund designed to underpin an objective 
for private investment of 315 billion euros. This 
was an initiative that was flagged in advance of the 
election of the President, and indeed in advance 
of the elections themselves. It can thus be said to 
have had a degree of electoral support (in as far 
as electors were aware of the Juncker programme) 
but it also fitted more easily within the spirit of the 
times. Rather than proposing additional public 
finance on a large scale, it has illustrated how 
added value can be seen in terms of using public 
finance to encourage the commitment of private 
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monies, without seeking to change the behaviour 
of the Member States. It must surely suggest a 
future direction for the budget when even the 
British government has been keen to give the 
initiative its fullest support!
Such a view might appear a heresy to those who 
were engaged in developing the EU budget in 
the 1980s and 1990s, but as Giacomo Benedetto 
points out, the passage of time has not made it any 
easier to reach extensive bargains on the shape 
of the budget. Every time that the MFF has been 
renegotiated, great hopes have been expressed 
about altering the budget framework substantially, 
but those hopes have been consistently dashed. 
This status quo orientation was underlined after 
the Lisbon Treaty came into effect in 2009. For the 
first time since the 1970s, the budgetary procedure 
was amended, giving the Parliament an equal say 
with the Council on all expenditure, as well as 
the right to give its consent to the MFF. However, 
this did not result in the substantial change that 
many, especially in the Parliament, had hoped for. 
The level of the MFF remains hostage to multiple 
veto players and the annual budget has arguably 
become more difficult for the Parliament to shape. 
Perhaps the central problem with developing an 
accepted vocabulary about added value in the EU 
budget lies in any discussion for reform being 
discussed in terms of its impact on the finances of 
individual countries. Net beneficiaries always fear 
changes will involve a potential loss for them; net 
contributors are determined to ensure that they 
do not pay more. Both categories are reluctant to 
consider the impact of change on the EU as a whole. 
Nowhere is this frame of mind more obvious than 
in the UK rebate, established more than 30 years 
ago. It has become such an article of faith that 
any attempt to change it has either failed or led to 
complex formulae designed to compensate certain 
member states for their contributions to the rebate. 
Moreover, as Benedetto points out, it has acted as 
a discouragement to UK governments to seek EU 
financing. A good example has been the flooding 
that struck parts of Britain in early 2014 and at the 
end of 2015. On both occasions there was no great 
enthusiasm to seek funding from the European 
Solidarity Fund, which was specifically designed to 
assist member states affected by a natural disaster. 
At least part of the explanation lies in the fact that 
any increase in receipts from the EU would reduce 
the rebate which the UK had come to expect. The 
value of the budget is perceived as much in terms 
of reducing overall government expenditure as it 
is in achieving a specific public good. Hence the 
enormous challenge facing the Monti Group to 
alter perceptions of the way the EU can and should 
be financed. Its conclusions will immediately be 
examined through the lens of profit and loss for 
national treasuries.
In the face of a budget structure which is so 
status-quo oriented, there is a temptation to 
suggest, as Benedetto does, that the only solution 
is to allow for special arrangements that either 
apply to a smaller number of states, such as a 
Financial Transaction Tax, or that are based on 
intergovernmental arrangements. In the latter 
category, one might include the 3bn euros set 
aside for assisting Turkey in restricting the flow 
of refugees from Syria to Europe. However, it is 
not at all clear that such policy choices can easily 
be translated into budgetary reality. They rely 
on Member States fulfilling their commitments 
to collect or provide finance and they also raise 
questions as to how spending will be monitored 
outside the formal budgetary system. Moreover, 
it is by no means clear that they will be accepted 
as legitimate any more readily within national 
societies that are deeply resistant to solutions 
sought at the EU level. 
The central issue that remains is one that has 
always bedevilled EU politics, namely how to 
define the general or Union interest in relation 
to the particular interests of the Member States. 
Is that general interest anything more than the 
sum of the individual interests? Or can it be used 
as a criterion to develop policies that go further? 
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As the workshop showed, this is not a technical 
question but a fundamentally political question. 
The suggestion by the Italian Finance Minister, 
for example, Pier Paolo Padoan, to develop an 
unemployment insurance mechanism as a way 
of underpinning economic and monetary union 
will appear to some as an excellent example of 
furthering the general interest, but for others 
it steps into the realm of national politics and 
challenges the specific interests of other states. 
How to resolve this conundrum remains the 
fundamental difficulty of added value in the EU 
budget now as it was 25 years ago.






by Alfredo De Feo
Introduction
In times of economic crisis and instability there 
is an increased need to mobilise public funds to 
stimulate growth, but at the same time in these 
periods there is a scarcity of resources. This 
situation stimulates a search for more efficiency 
and effectiveness, and ultimately a better use of 
resources in terms of concentrating funds and 
focusing on results. Because of its size, the EU 
budget has a limited macro-economic impact 
but its leverage effect and its capacity to mobilize 
resources through co-financing are important and 
can make a difference. 
The EU Budget has a potential capacity to 
contribute more to economic governance as it 
can drive changes in the European economy. 
There seem to be two necessary conditions for 
it to achieve this objective: a reform, with a new 
balance between its redistributive (agriculture and 
cohesion) and investment (competitiveness) roles, 
and more efficiency and effectiveness in delivering 
the expected results.
In spite of a global reduction of resources, the 2014-
2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 
has continued this (slow) evolution towards a re-
balancing between redistribution and investment. 
Agriculture has been reduced by more than 13% 
with respect to the previous period and cohesion 
policy has been reduced by about 8%, while the 
heading of Competitiveness for growth and jobs – 
which includes research and innovation; education 
and training; trans-European energy, transport 
and telecommunications networks; social policy; 
and enterprise development – has been increased 
with respect to the previous period by more than 
35%. This trend was already initiated in the 2007-
2013 programming period.
Good coordination of financial efforts and a 
concentration of funds on shared priorities can 
have dynamic effects, but only on condition 
that fundamental EU principles are respected. 
EU legislation and subsequent support from 
the EU Budget should only intervene when the 
principles of subsidiarity and European added 
value are respected. The EU should only legislate 
when action at the EU level is more efficient than 
action at the national level and a European added 
value can be demonstrated. Another principle 
is the ‘additionality’ of funds (particularly for 
structural funds). EU funds should not replace 
national funds but always come as a complement. 
Furthermore, the allocation of funds should not 
be directed at single projects but should be part of 
a strategy aligned with EU priorities.
In spite of the control exerted by governments 
and national parliaments, the full respect for these 
three principles is at least questionable. In many 
cases, the adoption of a regulation is more the 
result of a sum of national interests than genuine 
European added value. 
This article will raise the following questions:
a) Can EU policies gain efficiency if resources are 
allocated according to performance and results? 
b) Could Member State experiences with 
performance-based budgeting (PBB) offer 
support and inspiration?
c) Which key indicators (KIs) are more suitable 
for use as budgetary indicators?
d) How can EU legislation influence the 
introduction of a budget more focused on 
results?
e) How can a budget oriented towards results be 
managed in the EU decision-making process?
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The EU decision-making 
process
Using public funds in an efficient and effective way 
is a pre-condition for financing public policies 
which are the best tools to implement shared 
objectives. The Member States have numerous 
experiences of using performance-based 
budgeting and evaluating what is considered to be 
good performance at various levels. The starting 
point for this exercise is the decision-making 
process, as performance-based budgeting might 
ultimately influence the allocation of resources. 
In an individual Member State, the executive 
proposes a budget to the parliament. Discussion 
then takes place mostly internally between the 
government and its majority. After a vote in 
parliament, the ministries or executive agencies 
implement the political decisions included in the 
budget.
In launching the conference on a budget for 
results, the Commission has opened up reflections 
on performance budgeting within EU institutions. 
Before going into more detail, this section will 
describe some specificities of the EU environment 
which might influence these reflections on 
performance budgeting. 
The EU Budget process is different: there is 
no predefined majority and co-decisions on 
Commission proposals can combine a composite 
majority of Member States (with governments 
of different political parties and often with 
diverging national interests), which needs to find 
a compromise with the European Parliament 
(which has its own majorities). These are, in short, 
provisions of the Treaties. Practice produces 
other complexities. Pre-allocation of funds 
might negatively influence the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the use of EU funds. Until the end 
of the 1990s, the Commission refused not only to 
guarantee any pre-allocation of funds but also to 
give ex-post information on implementation in 
individual Member States. The Commission then 
had more liberty to allocate funds in relation to 
the quality of programmes. 
Pre-allocation to Member States, which has now 
become part of the negotiations, is not per se a 
form of poor performance but it certainly limits 
the Commission’s choice to pick projects with the 
most potential for performance and EU added 
value. It has probably diffused a negative culture 
in EC and Member State administration: pre-
allocated spending has become an objective in 
itself for EC managers, and for Member States 
even low-performance spending is better that no 
spending.
Evidence of this cultural approach can be found 
in the frantic negotiations that take place between 
the Commission services and some Member 
States over last-minute ‘re-programming’ of 
the financing of new projects and pre-financed 
projects. The aim of these negotiations for all the 
participants is to spend EU money at any cost in 
full compliance with the rules, but not necessarily 
respecting performance criteria. 
EU programmes which have a high absorption 
capacity are considered successful. The rate of 
implementation is perceived not only by the media 
but also by the control bodies in the European 
Parliament as a distinguishing element between 
successful and unsuccessful policies. Success 
of a programme has up to now been measured 
in terms of compliance with the rules and the 
level of disbursement. These considerations are 
clearly stated in the EU Court of Auditors report: 
“Financial management may largely focus on 
spending the budget available” (Court of Auditors, 
footnote 1, page 28). According to the Court, the 
different administrative cultures of European, 
national, regional and local administrations also 
inevitably lead to a poor quality of spending.
This should not be an alibi for reversing the charge 
to the Member States. The use of performance 
indicators in a European environment can only 
be be achieved in close cooperation with them, 
eventually by creating incentives to achieve a 
change of culture and therefore a change in the 
outputs of legislation which is implemented. 
A PERFORMANCE-BASED BUDGET TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS - Alfredo De Feo
47
The elements mentioned above are not causes of 
inefficiency, but they have contributed to a certain 
culture of spending for the sake of spending which 
has more favoured the quantity than the quality 
of the implementation of EU funding. Most of the 
specificities of the EU decision-making process 
can be changed, and in any case they should be 
taken into account.
Measuring the efficiency of an EU policy starts 
with the adoption of the legislative act in which 
the objectives of the action are established. The 
clearer and more focused the objectives are, the 
more it is possible to measure and monitor the 
implementation of the policy. The practice of the 
legislative decision-making process provides for 
each regulation to have a financial envelope, which 
has a quite rigid status. This is generally respected 
during the annual budgetary procedure.
This practice of embedding financial envelopes 
in legislative acts started in the 1980s when the 
Parliament was excluded from the legislative 
process but had ‘quasi exclusive’ budgetary powers 
over non-compulsory expenditure, which covered 
most of the legislation but not agriculture. Through 
rigid financial envelopes, the Council indirectly 
secured budgetary decisions. This tradition of 
financial envelopes in legislative acts has even 
been maintained in the ordinary procedure 
under the EU treaty where the Parliament is a 
co-legislator. The financial envelope is certainly 
a useful tool for determining the magnitude of a 
policy but the institutions have recognized that 
its full rigidity negatively impacts the efficiency 
of policies and in an inter-institutional agreement 
they have admitted the possibility of diverging 
from the envelope by 10% in either direction. 
This is another element that should be taken into 
account in reflections on a more efficient budget.
To conclude, there are many specificities in the EU 
budgetary and legislative process which should 
be taken into account if we want to develop 
performance-measuring elements in the decision-
making process.
A budget for results:  
a Commission flagship
The Treaty of Lisbon raised the relevance of 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the policies 
financed by the Budget. Following art. 318, the 
Commission has to submit an annual report 
which evaluates ‘the Union’s finances based on the 
results achieved.’ Since 2010, the Court of Auditors 
has drawn the attention of the institutions to 
the necessity of enhancing the assessment of the 
quality of expenditure. 
This sensitivity has increased over the years. 
The renewal of all the legislation with a financial 
impact in the period 2014-2020 has allowed the 
introduction in the ‘spending’ regulations of a 
number of performance objectives and indicators, 
macro-economic conditionality and evaluation 
and reporting arrangements, including – in the 
case of structural funds – the possibility of drawing 
supplementary funds from a ‘performance reserve.’ 
In the 56 programme statements in the 2014-2020 
legislative package there are about 300 objectives 
and 700 indicators, both general and specific. 
Almost half of the programmes have more than 
10 objectives, while some have more than 20 and 
a few more than 40. Are these too many for real 
control? For a more effective use of performance-
based budgeting, a concentration of objectives 
and key indicators will be necessary.
The Commission has to report on the legality, 
regularity and compliance with the indicators in 
its Annual Activity Reports and in its report ex art 
318 TFEU. It was only in the fifth report ex art 318 
TFEU evaluating the ‘Union’s Finances based on 
results achieved’ (com(2015) 313) that it started 
to give more relevance to EU added value, which 
it defined as “the value resulting from an EU 
intervention which is additional to the value that 
would have been otherwise created by member 
states alone” and which can be assessed on the 
basis of the following three criteria:
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a. Effectiveness. If it is the only way to get results, 
it may be more effective to create missing links, 
avoid fragmentation and realise the potential of 
a border-free Europe. 
b. Efficiency. It may also be more efficient if 
the EU offers better value for money because 
externalities can be addressed, resources or 
expertise can be pooled and action can be better 
coordinated. 
c. Synergy: It may create synergies where EU 
action is necessary to complement, stimulate 
and leverage actions to reduce disparities and 
raise standards.
To conclude, there is a new awareness of a switch 
from compliance with rules to effective results, 
but this is only the beginning of a complex process 
of which for the time being probably only the 
Commission – or more exactly only Commissioner 
Georgieva and DG BUDG – is fully convinced. 
Will the other Commission departments and 
the other institutions follow this movement? 
This is the question which will be analysed in the 
following sections. 
The momentum for a step 
forward
Joint efforts by the Court of Auditors and the 
European Parliament – notably its Budgetary 
Control committee (see the discharge resolutions 
in 2013, 2014 and 2015 and the CONT hearings 
in 2013) – have contributed to creating a new 
approach which is more attentive to the quality 
of expenditure. The ten priorities announced by 
Juncker in November 2014 required a concentration 
of EU funds to increase the effectiveness of EU 
strategy. In the same period, the president of the 
CoA presented a document entitled ‘Making 
the best use of EU money: a landscape review of 
the risks to the financial management of the EU 
budget’ containing a lucid analysis of the risks and 
their remedies involved in making the best use of 
EU money. 
The emergencies linked to the flux of migrants 
have made it evident that a sound use of EU funds 
is not only a moral obligation but also a necessity 
when high unforeseen expenditures from the 
EU budget are necessary. The full endorsement 
of this new approach focused on outputs by the 
Juncker Commission is a demonstration that EU 
leaders are marching in the direction of efficiency 
and effectiveness and the ‘EU Budget focused on 
Results’ conference organised by VP Georgieva in 
September 2015 launched a campaign to introduce 
a new administrative culture, beginning with the 
Commission staff. 
The issues addressed by the 
Court
The CoA raised several criticisms of the current 
system. The environment is complex: 30 policy 
areas, often with their own financial requirements 
and multiple objectives;  central, regional, and 
local administrations of 28 Member States with 
different administrative cultures; countries outside 
the EU; other international organisations; private 
companies. These are only the main points. These 
elements are not negative per se but they create 
favourable conditions for inefficiency.
In particular, the Court focussed on seven 
recurrent weaknesses: a) the purpose of funding 
is not clear; b) there are too many or unclear 
objectives; c) the needs of potential beneficiaries 
are not adequately assessed; d) the selection criteria 
are insufficient and aid is not targeted at projects 
most in need; e) eligibility criteria are unclear or 
inconsistently applied; f) the EU dimension and 
EU added value are often questionable; and g) 
there is no assessment of the reasonability of costs 
charged to EU actions. The Court pointed out that 
the Member States have no incentives to address 
the weaknesses of the system, as often from their 
perspective EU funds are always useful even if 
they do not totally comply with the principle of 
EU added value.
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The CoA not only presented weaknesses but also 
opportunities. Especially at the beginning of a 
new financial framework, four main areas for 
improvement were identified: a) focussing on 
the added value of programmes; b) developing a 
performance management culture; c) reinforcing 
budgetary management; d) reinforcing 
cooperation with the Members States over the 
implementation of control. 
The Member States, which manage 80% of EU 
funds, have to comply with rules and control 
mechanisms. The annual reports from the Court of 
Auditors and the level of material errors show that 
these rules are neither known nor fully integrated in 
national or regional legislation. The Commission’s 
authority in negotiations with Member States 
is weakened and often in the interpretation of 
the rules the focus is on spending more than on 
the quality and achievement of objectives. The 
Member States, which are often reluctant to be 
too strict in controlling funds from which they are 
the primary beneficiaries, can become a support if 
incentives are created to stimulate more effective 
control of compliance with European principles.
Some budgeting methods 
Since 2007, the OECD has conducted extensive 
comparative studies on ‘Budgeting practices 
and procedures in OECD countries.’ One of the 
conclusions is that performance information, 
despite being used by most of the states, is not 
the exclusive reference element in the preparation 
of a budget. Is a budget based on measurable 
performance more efficient and effective? The 
answer is not straightforward and is more complex. 
Outputs are fundamental to the appraisal of the 
effectiveness of a policy but at the same time they 
risk giving a distorted picture of the situation: they 
might disregard some other relevant parameters, 
they do not help to redress situations, and they 
cannot take into account political values which 
might be attached to poor output (e.g. the impact 
of investment in disadvantaged areas will not give 
the same output as investment in a developed area 
but it remains politically and socially important). 
The OECD defines six areas in which to uniformly 
assess the use and quality of performance 
information: a) financial data (i.e. revenues received, 
resources spent, outputs and outcomes achieved); 
b) performance reports with operational data; c) 
performance evaluations (‘results’-oriented data); 
d) spending reviews; e) statistical information; 
and f) external performance information. The 
results of this analysis are contained in an OECD 
publication entitled ‘The metamorphoses of 
performance budgeting.’ 
Among various budgeting mechanisms, three 
are most used: a rolling budget, which improves 
forecasting and planning; an activity-based 
budget, which favours operational issues; and a 
performance budget, which is based on outputs. 
Each budgeting method has its own advantages 
and disadvantages, so the question is how these 
three methods can be combined to best advantage 
in the European environment.
Rolling Budget
Since 1988 the EU has formalised the planning 
of its expenditure over 7-year periods. While the 
multiannual financial framework has the merit of 
framing the financing of EU policies, it has two 
major drawbacks: a) it is extremely rigid, and 
b) it is a too long. These two drawbacks linked 
together make the instrument unsuitable for 
improving efficiency and effectiveness, and they 
might even have negative effects. In fact, once the 
MFF is established it is very difficult to modify, 
and any change is only possible at the margins 
(flexibility instrument). A rolling budget also has 
disadvantages: it creates a system which is unstable 
with a sort of continual revision of figures and 
consequently of the objectives to pursue. 
A rolling financial mechanism could be 
compatible with the EU environment, but if it is 
linked to the results of the policies with public 
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funding. The updates could be every three years, 
following assessment of implementation. The aims 
of the exercise should be to reduce allocations 
to underperforming programmes, to increase 
well-performing spending, and to re-prioritize 
spending to allow space for new priorities. The 
existence of a performance reserve could play an 
important incentive role for managers. 
Although the MFF has a mid-term review 
clause and the Commission presents a mid-term 
assessment, for several reasons mainly linked to 
the Council’s approach, this exercise, at least so far, 
has never produced concrete effects and never led 
to a revision. This is mainly due to the difficulty 
in re-opening negotiations. This political difficulty 
should not be underestimated but Member States 
should see the interest in having better results 
from EU-funded policies. Events in recent months 
show the need for a flexible budget capable of 
allowing new financing to face new challenges and 
unforeseen events. If the institutions make full use 
of the mid-term review in 2017, it could be the 
first step in the direction of rolling planning.
Activity-based budget
An activity-based budget18 links the costs incurred 
by activities in a functional way. It allows strategic 
objectives to be aligned with financial and human 
resources. This is the budgeting method used by the 
EU since 2002. It has brought more transparency 
to the assessment of the cost of policies, but more 
than 13 years after the introduction of the EU-
ABB the Court of Auditors singled out weaknesses 
which are linked not only to the budget but also to 
legislation (e.g. too many objectives, insufficient, 
unclear or inconsistent selection of eligibility 
criteria and often questionable EU added value). 
The ABB method needs to be revised to respond 
to the criticisms of the CoA.
18  Activity-Based Budgeting (ABB) is defined as a 
method of budgeting in which the activities that incur costs in 
every functional area of an organization are recorded and their 
relationships are defined and analysed. Activities are then tied to 
strategic goals, after which the costs of the necessary activities are 
used to create the budget. Investopedia  http://www.investopedia.
com/terms/a/abb.asp#ixzz3rq0SYVpr 
Performance budgeting 
Performance budgeting  takes into consideration 
the relation between inputs, outputs and services 
achieved to measure the efficiency of public 
spending by means of indicators. Interest in 
performance budgeting has risen since the 
beginning of 2000 when governments sought to 
improve expenditure efficiency by linking funding 
to results and to find support for re-prioritizing 
their policies. The IMF has collected various 
elements linked to performance budgeting in 
the volume ‘Performance Budgeting: linking 
funding and results,’ which shows the complexity 
of the exercise and its implementation in different 
countries. It can be concluded that ‘one size does 
not fit all.’ Examples of performance budgeting, 
but with different degrees of integration in the 
budgetary process, exist in various EU Member 
States and also in the US.
Performance budgeting implies choosing shared 
indicators to measure the outputs and outcomes 
of a programme, taking into account external 
factors and time lapses which might influence the 
results. It provides more flexibility and autonomy 
in the management of  programmes. The EU 
Financial Regulation should therefore be adapted. 
Experience shows that a large investment, 
especially in administration but also at the political 
level, is necessary when adapting to a performance 
budgeting method.
Measuring the output of legislation implemented 
can be a treacherous exercise. Either it is left to 
technocrats, with the risk of transforming the 
budgetary exercise into a ‘perfect algorithm,’ or 
the decision on defining the metrics is given to 
the legislator with the risk of achieving good 
compromises but not viable indicators. Using the 
performance budgeting model to establish the EU 
budget could expose the EU to risks and reduce 
the political impact of the budget.
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A new budget model for the 
EU? 
The EU needs more efficiency and effectiveness 
in managing its policies. A budget more focused 
on results is the objective that the Commission 
set with the conference on 22 September 2015.19 
This is an ambitious but necessary process and 
it is possible if the objective is shared by all EU 
stakeholders, Commissions, General Directorates, 
the Budgetary Authority and the Member States.
Which model for the EU?
Performance budgeting is a powerful tool which 
allocates resources on the basis of outputs/
outcomes, and it is used by many governments 
around the world. The in-depth analyses by the 
OECD and the IMF20 give a number of reflections 
which are useful before analysing the possible 
impact of performance budgeting methods on the 
EU decision-making process: 
 ✓ There is no a single model of performance 
budgeting (PBB) and over time governments 
have experimented with variations on 
the leading principle. Most states include 
performance budgeting information during the 
budgetary process. 
 ✓ No government uses PBB as an automatic 
mechanism to allocate financial and human 
resources. 
 ✓ Translation of performance information into 
budgetary decisions is one of the hardest 
challenges. Even for governments which have 
used PBB for decades, in practice the link 
between the performance information and 
their budgetary decisions are often weak (or 
inexistent). 
 ✓ The implementation of a PBB approach requires 
a change of culture for the managers in charge of 
budget implementation and they need flexibility 
19  EU Budget Focused on Results Conference, http://
ec.europa.eu/budget/budget4results/programme/index_en.cfm 
20  See References 5 to 9. 
in the financial and human resources available 
to achieve the best results. Administrations 
with many rigidities in the management of 
financial and human resources cannot enjoy the 
advantages of a budget focused on results.
 ✓ PBB works better in lower level administration 
(i.e. the local dimension) than in high level 
administration (i.e. supranational), and it works 
better in limited and specific sectors than on a 
wider scale.
 ✓ The success factor in PBB is the clarity and 
specificity of the objectives, which should not be 
too vague and should be related to the capacity 
to monitor.
Implications for the EU
Evolution toward a performance budgeting 
approach is not only necessary but also desirable to 
make EU disbursements more effective and visible 
to the citizens in terms of European added value. 
EU programmes should have clearly identified 
objectives and SMART21 indicators need to be 
defined with the agreement of all the institutions 
to measure the effectiveness of the outputs and 
outcomes. This information should be used by the 
Budgetary Authority to make informed decisions 
on the allocation of funds to each programme and 
on positive and negative priorities.
The performance indicators should measure the 
effectiveness of European decisions. A performance 
budget is not only a budgetary technique; it might 
require a change of approach by the legislative 
authority. At the least, legislation should include 
clear objectives for each programme and the other 
elements of evaluation should be defined either 
during the legislative process (i.e. delegated) or by 
the control and budgetary authority.
A budget more focused on results does not need a 
financial envelope to be included in the ordinary 
law; instead an indication of the magnitude of a 
programme could be given as an upper ceiling. 
21  Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, Timely
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Currently, the financial envelope embedded in 
the Regulation constitutes an implementation 
objective for each manager of EU programmes. 
Respect for the financial envelope year after year 
and independently of outputs is a guarantee 
given to each programme which will not be 
admissible if more stress is put on the results. 
The financial envelope included in EU legislative 
acts was introduced in the pre-Lisbon budgetary 
procedure, when the Council needed to secure the 
amount for each programme in the legislation to 
prevent a possible decision by the Parliament on 
non-compulsory expenditure.
In a budgetary environment aimed at results, 
the financial envelope should become a purely 
indicative element and the budgetary authority 
should be free to divert resources as a function 
of the performance of a programme. The 10% 
divergence from the financial envelope admitted 
in the interinstitutional agreement is a step in 
the right direction, but it is still too limiting and 
in reality it lacks a consistent procedure for its 
implementation. 
The control and budgetary authority could 
contribute to stricter control of the performance 
and results achieved by legislation by adapting 
its working methods. Structures and procedures 
should then be put in place for the assessment of all 
legislation and this should involve budgetary and 
policy experts in both the Council and Parliament. 
The Commission should play a fundamental role 
in building this procedure, but the leading role 
should be left to the legislative and budgetary 
authorities, with the active support of the Court 
of Auditors. 
A procedure combining discharge and budgetary 
procedures should be established. The annual 
report from the Court of Auditors should be 
linked and used as a basis for the establishment 
of the N+1 budget. Already for several years the 
Parliament has timidly created monitoring groups 
on implementation involving various stakeholders, 
but the difficulty in making political decisions 
due to the rigidity of the financial envelopes has 
discouraged MEPs from making any investment 
in this procedure. 
To conclude, there is a need for legislation which 
can bring European added value. For it to be 
implemented its targets should be shared by all 
the institutions, and they should be ready to 
adapt their working methods. All the changes 
introduced should avoid performance budgeting 
becoming a technocratic exercise, but instead a 
tool which can lead to a decision to reinforce the 
European dimension of legislation and provide 
more political control over implementation. This 
cultural change can only be achieved if all the 
actors – EU institutions and also Member States 
– agree to put this new evaluation procedure in 
place. No legislative changes are necessary but 
more substance should be given to what are now 
empty procedures. 
The mid-term review of a 5-year MFF could 
become the moment to bring the results of two or 
three years of monitoring to concrete decisions on 
the financial envelopes of programmes, translating 
positive and negative priorities which are also 
based on concrete outputs and performances. It is 
important that the decisions in this new monitoring 
system are not taken annually but at a precise 
moment. Apart from exceptional cases, annual 
decisions on the performance of a programme 
can be disruptive to its implementation. Annually, 
the discharge and budgetary authority may simply 
issue recommendations to draw attention to 
eventual poor performance in certain policy areas. 
Finally, this new approach may endanger the 
allocation of funds to specific Member States. 
As described above, this is a practice which is, 
in my view, contrary to the European spirit. The 
allocation mechanism put in place by the EFSI, 
where projects are financed on their pure merits 
and not as part of a national envelope, seems to 
go in this direction. At the same time, it would 
probably be difficult to dismantle this practice, 
but more pressure and transparency should oblige 
Member States to aim at results.
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To summarize, opening reflection on performance 
budgeting is definitely a necessary step to give 
EU financing a better image. On the basis of 
the experience of other states, including the EU 
Member States, a performance budget can operate 
at various levels, from being an information 
tool to an automatic decision mechanism, with 
other variations. The level should be decided by 
the inter-institutional working group which has 
been created (but not set up yet). This exercise 
may take a long time as it implies a change of 
administrative culture in the EU institutions, and 
also in the Member States and other stakeholders. 
It might entail streamlining some elements in the 
regulations. A change of this importance needs the 
ownership and full support of all stakeholders. A 
pilot on a limited number of programmes could be 
an interesting test and part of the learning process.
A final reflection concerns the performance not 
of a programme but of the whole EU budget. 
How can the EU budget be maximised to meet 
the challenges that the EU and in particular 
the eurozone is confronted with? How can the 
EU budget perform better to tackle European 
challenges? Are the means available sufficient? 
This reflection, which might be carried out by the 
newly created inter-institutional working group or 
by a separate entity, should open a reflection on 
the future of the EU budget, the own resources 
and the governance needs of the eurozone. This 
debate is probably too difficult to be popular, but 
it is necessary if we want to get away from business 
as usual and give some new vision to European 
integration.
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ANNEX: PROGRAMME OF THE WORKSHOP 
The Efficiency and Effectiveness of the  
EU budget
European University Institute, Fiesole, Florence
1-2 October 2015 
Rationale: The EU budget represents only 1% of GNI but its impact on the economy is higher due to its 
leverage effects. How can the EU Budget be more focused on results, strengthening its efficiency and 
effectiveness? Improvement of the quality of expenditure is the challenge for the next few years. The 
workshop will try to provide an answer, starting from the experience of beneficiaries of EU funds and 
the comments of academicians and practitioners.
1st October 2015
14.15  Welcome: Joseph Weiler, President of the EUI 
 Opening: Kristalina Georgieva, Vice President of the Commission
14.30 Keynote speech: Pier Carlo Padoan, Minister of Finance, Italy
Debate
15.15  Panel I: How EU contributions are perceived by beneficiaries
 Chair: Brigid Laffan
 Mr. Hansjörg König, Secretary of State, Ministry of Finance, Saxonia
 Dott.ssa Ludovica Agrò, Director General of the Agency for territorial cohesion
 Dott.ssa Giada Mennutti, Enterprises Europe Network
 Mr. David Stefano Zolesi, responsible for the Kayser srl research project 
Debate
16.30  Panel II – the EU budget as added value 
 How can efficiency be measured? Is the money going where it is intended to go? Are the policy 
objectives reached? Is the implementation correctly managed and monitored? How can ex-post 
impact assessment influence legislation? 
 Chair: Carlos Closa (EUI)
 Keynote speech: Kristalina Georgieva, Vice President of the Commission
 Speakers: Giacomo Benedetto (Royal Holloway, London University), Eulalia Rubio, Notre 
Europe, Brussels





9.30 Panel III – Better spending: can the EU budget be more effective?
 How can the EU budget contribute further to the economic recovery? How can the budget 
support the reform of EU policies? Does the EU budget support the development of SMEs? 
What can be done to make public spending more productive? How is the EU budget perceived 
by beneficiaries?
 Chair: Alfredo De Feo (EP/EUI)
 Speakers: Jorge Nunez Ferrer (CEPS), Ian Begg (London School of Economics)
 Discussant: Alexander G. Welzl, Economica Institute, Wien 
11.15 Coffee break
11.30 Panel IV – Which steps to improve budgetary efficiency?
 Chair: Adrienne Heritier, Upsala University
 Keynote speech: Kevin Cardiff (Member of the Court of Auditors)
 Discussant: Silvano Presa (Commission) 
12.30 Debate
13.15 Conclusion, Brigid Laffan
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